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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103.
ISSUES P R E S E N T E D FOR REVIEW

Did the trial court err in striking certain portions of submitted affidavits in
support of Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Appellees' Motion for
Summary Judgment?
Standard of Review: Abuse-of-discretion. In reviewing a decision to striking affidavits
an appellate court "looks to [its] prior decisions regarding the admission of evidence
more generally." In civil cases, where the evidence sought to be introduced does not
raise concerns of the type that have produced heightened standards of sensitivity, a
trial court decision to admit evidence is reviewed under a broad grant of discretion. In
re General Determination of Rights to Use of All Water, 982 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah, 1999).
Issue Preserved at: [R. 357-359, 447-449, 452-454, 462].
Did the trial court err in determining that Appellant had no legally protectable
interest in his position as a volunteer coach?
Standard of Review: Correctness. Schurt^ v. BMW ofN. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah
1991). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court views "the facts
in a light most favorable to the losing party below" and gives "no deference to the
trial court's conclusions of law: those conclusions are reviewed for correctness." Blue
Cross <&Blue Shield v. State of Utah, 119 P.2d 634, 636-37 (Utah 1989); see also Goodnow
v. Sullivan, 2002 UT 21, f 1, 44 P.3d 704.
Issue Preserved at: [R. 202-245, 311-352, 405-422, 448-452].
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3.

Did the trial court err in determining that the Appellant's Amended Notice of
Claim was inadequate to put Appellee Lehi City on notice of Appellant's
defamation and breach of contract causes of action?
Standard of Review: Correctness. Schurt^ v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah
1991). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court views "the facts
in a light most favorable to the losing party below" and gives "no deference to the
trial court's conclusions of law: those conclusions are reviewed for correctness." Blue
Cross & Blue Shield v. State of Utah, 119 P.2d 634, 636-37 (Utah 1989); see also Goodnow
v. Sullivan, 2002 UT 2 1 4 1, 44 P.3d 704.
Issue Preserved at: [R. 204, 311, 445-447].
S T A T E M E N T OF T H E CASE

Nature of the Case.
1.

This appeal requires the Court to determine the following questions of law:
(1)

Whether the paragraphs stricken from submitted affidavits in support of
Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment
were relevant, established foundation, were non-conclusory, and admissible;

(2)

Whether Appellant had a legally protectable interest in his position as a
volunteer coach and the subsidiary questions:
(a)

Whether volunteers are entitled to the same or similar First
Amendment protections as public employees;

(b)

Whether the individual Appellees are protected from Appellant's 42
U.S.C. §1983 claim by a qualified immunity defense;

(c)

Whether Appellant provided clearly established legal authority from the
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Tenth Circuit to prove that he is entitled to First Amendment
protection even though he was a volunteer;
(d)

Whether, for purposes of his Fourteenth Amendment violation claim,
Appellant established: (1) that he was treated differently from other
similarly situated volunteers, and (2) that Appellees had no rational
basis for the disparate treatment;

(e)

Whether Appellee Lehi City may be held liable for the acts of its
employees if it is established that those employees did violate
Appellant's constitutional rights;

(f)

Whether Appellant had constitutionally protected liberty or property
interests sufficient to invoke Fourteenth Amendment rights;

(g)

If Appellant did have a liberty and/or property interest in volunteer
coaching, whether the trial court's failure to analyze and determine
Appellant's procedural due process claim was erroneous;

(h)

Whether Appellant is entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C §
1988(b) if he establishes his 42 U.S.C § 1983 claims.

(3)

Whether Appellant strictly complied with Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7401 (3)(a)(ii) even though the Amended Notice of Claim did not specifically list
potential breach of contract and defamation claims.

The Appellant in this case (who was Plaintiff in the underlying trial case) is William A.
Doyle, a resident of Utah County, Utah.
The Appellees in this case are Lehi City, a Utah municipal corporation [R. 20], Blythe
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Bray, an employee of Lehi City [R. 20], Daniel Harrison, an employee of Lehi City [R.
19], and Amanda Len Mackintosh, an employee of Lehi City. [R. 19].
4.

For ease of reference, this Brief will refer to Lehi City, Blythe Bray, Daniel Harrison,
and Amanda Len Mackintosh collectively as the "Appellees."

Course of Proceedings/Disposition of trial court.
5.

On September 6, 2007, Appellant filed a Verified Complaint in the Fourth Judicial
District Court, Utah County against Appellees. [R. 1-20].

6.

On August 29, 2008, Appellant filed an Amended Verified Complaint in the Fourth
Judicial District Court, Utah County against Appellees. [R. 38-61].

7.

In the Amended Verified Complaint^ Appellant alleged the following eight causes of
action:

8.

(1)

First Amendment Retaliation;

(2)

Equal Protection;

(3)

Defamation;

(4)

Procedural Due Process - Liberty Interest;

(5)

Procedural Due Process — Property Interest;

(6)

42 U.S.C. §1983 Cause of Action;

(7)

42 U.S.C. §1988(b) Cause of Action; and

(8)

Breach of Contract.

Appellees filed an Answer and Notice of Intent to Rely on ]ury Demand on October 6,
2008. [R. 62-79].

9.

On August 7, 2009, Appellees submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to
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Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Motionfor SummaryJudgmentand accompanying
memorandum addressed Appellant's qualified immunity claim, constitutional claim,
attorney fees claim, and Notice of Claim. [R. 97-100, 201-245].
10.

Appellant filed a Memoranda in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment on August
31,2009. [R. 250-352].

11.

On September 21, 2009, Appellees filed a Motion to Strike Affidavits with an
accompanying memorandum. [R. 353-361].

12.

Appellees filed a Reply Memoranda in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment on
September 21, 2009. [R. 121,128].

13.

Appellant filed a Memoranda in Opposition to the Motion to Strike on October 5, 2009.
[R. 423-428].

14.

Appellees filed a Reply Memoranda in support of the Motion to Strike Affidavits on
October 19, 2009. [R. 429-435].

15.

After the trial court heard oral arguments on December 14, 2009 [R. 475, p. 1-45] and
on January 11, 2010 [R. 476, p. 1-47], the trial court issued its ruling on March 23,
2010 [R. 443-464] and entered an Order Granting Defendants Motionfor Summary Judgment
and Motion to Strike on May 3, 2010. [R. 465-467].

16.

In its March 23, 2010 Ruling, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Appellees on all claims brought by Appellant. The trial court generally determined the
following [R. 464]:
a.

Appellees were entitled to qualified immunity as to any Constitutional-based
claim;
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b.

Appellant was not a public employee, but a volunteer; therefore, Appellant
had no legally protectable interest in coaching;

c.

Because the individual Appellees did not violate Appellant's rights (if any),
Appellant's claims must fail as a matter of law;

d.

Appellant had no constitutionally-protected property or liberty interest in his
position as a volunteer for the City;

e.

An analysis of any alleged procedural due process violation is unnecessary
because Appellant had no protected liberty or property interest to speak of;

f.

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) is not a separate cause of action, and at any rate, the court
has discretion to award fees only to a prevailing party. Because Appellant did
not prevail, he is not entkled to attorney's fees;

g.

Appellant's Amended Notice of Claim did not contain any claim for breach of
contract or defamation. Accordingly, those two claims merit dismissal;

h.

Appellant did not allege detrimental reliance and, therefore, could not claim
promissory estoppel with respect to his coaching position.

17.

The trial court determined that the following affidavits and their respective
paragraphs should be stricken for being irrelevant, lacking in foundation, conclusory,
containing inadmissible opinion testimony, and/or hearsay [R. 452-454]:
Affidavit

Bridgit Doyle
James Johnston
Alan Paul
Joyce Olson
Sharon Johnston
Wayne Stanley Crump
Roger Dean

Paragraph(s)
8,11,12,13,14,15,16 and 17
8,10,11,12,13,14 and 15
7, 8,10,11,12 and 13
8, 9 and 10
8
7
6
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18.

Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal on May 10, 2010. [R. 468-470].
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Parties and Background.
19.

This case involves the termination of Appellant William A. Doyle ("Appellant") from
his position as a volunteer coach for Appellee Lehi City. [R. 100].

20.

Lehi City is a municipality that offers formalized youth sports programs to its
residents. [R. 238].

21.

Lehi City operates the "Legacy Center," a gym and sports center located in Lehi
City. [R. 238].

22.

At all relevant times, Appellee Dan Harrison ("Harrison") was employed by Lehi
City as the Director of the Legacy Center. [R. 238].

23.

At all relevant times, Appellee Blythe Bray ("Bray") was the Youth Sports Director at
the Legacy Center. [R. 238].

24.

Harrison was Bray's immediate supervisor. [R. 234].

25.

At all relevant limes, Appellee Amanda Mackintosh ("Mackintosh") was employed by
Lehi City as a youth sports field supervisor. [R. 238].

26.

Appellant has been a volunteer coach for Lehi City's youth baseball program since
1981. [R. 463].

27.

Through his participation in the Lehi City's youth baseball program, Appellant
established a reputation within the community as a dedicated and skilled coach and a
man of good character and moral integrity. [R. 60].

28.

Pursuant to the Volunteer Code of Conduct for Lehi City, volunteers are subject to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the same standards of performance as regular employees, drug tests and background
checks. [R. 59, 77].
29.

Appellant had taken and passed the "Set a Good Example" (S.A.G.E.) program
required by Lehi City before participating in the Lehi City's youth baseball program.
Appellant received a card certifying that he had taken the S.A.G.E. class and was in
good standing to continue coaching youth baseball for Lehi City. [R. 59].

30.

During the 2006 baseball season, Appellant and his team, the "A's," finished in first
place in regular season play, won the Lehi City tournament and placed third in the
State tournament. [R. 59, 77].

31.

At the beginning of the 2006 season, Bray announced a change in procedure that
allowed certain teams to be unfairly stacked with an inordinate and disproportionate
amount of talented players. [R. 59].

32.

Appellant voiced his concerns to Bray that the method by which the draft was
conducted was unfair to participants of Lehi City's baseball program. [R. 59, 77].

33.

Throughout the 2006 season, Appellant voiced his concerns to Bray and other
members of the community regarding other matters of fairness and safety raised by
the administration of Lehi City's baseball program. [R. 58, 77].

34.

In July 2006, after the season had ended, Bray, on two separate occasions
affirmatively represented to both Appellant and his spouse, Bridgit Doyle that
Appellant would definitely coach a team for the 2007 youth baseball season. [R. 58].

Termination of the Appellant as Volunteer.
35.

In July 2006, Bray met with Harrison to discuss her concerns about Appellant and
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possible violations of the Volunteer Code of Conduct (which included allegations
that Appellant had periodically acted in an angry manner towards Legacy Center
personnel and/or umpires and had occasionally used the word "bullshit" in front of
some of the children). [R. 230].
36.

Bray and Harrison decided to wait until the following season to see if Doyle would
apply for a volunteer coaching position before deciding on the appropriate course of
action. [R. 229].

37.

In late March of 2007, Appellant completed and filed a Volunteer Coach Application
for the 2007 season. [R. 229].

38.

After Appellant submitted the application, Bray met with Harrison to discuss what
course of action to take. [R. 229].

39.

To prepare for discussing the issue of Appellant's alleged behavior in the 2006
season, Harrison asked Bray to prepare a list of each incident involving Appellant's
behavior of which she was aware. [R. 229].

40.

Bray prepared a list of each incident of Appellant's conduct that she believed violated
the Volunteer Code of Conduct or which she believed was disruptive to the program,
its employees, and other volunteers. [R. 229].

41.

The list included seven "instances" of allegedly disruptive behavior: three instances of
yelling about policies or programs, two instances of Appellant coming in to
Harrison's office to talk about a policy or program, one instance of starting a petition
concerning the recreational programs at the ballpark, and one instance of Appellant
appearing at Bray's office with his wife and other individuals to discuss a problem
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that occurred at one of the games. [R. 183].
42.

At least three of the instances cited by Bray could not be categorized as inappropriate
(an "OK" is written next to those instances), and importantly, in only one instance is
there an indication that Appellant used "inappropriate language." [R. 183].

43.

Ultimately Bray and Harrison jointly decided that, based upon alleged observations of
" improper conduct" on the part of Appellant by several individuals, Appellant would
be declined a volunteer position for the youth baseball program for the 2007 season.
[R. 228].

44.

On March 27, 2007, Harrison met with Appellant and informed Appellant that he
was prohibited from coaching youth baseball for the 2007 season due to complaints
about his behavior. [R. 58, 76, 228].

45.

Harrison told Appellant that Appellant could coach football or basketball, but not
basebaU. [R. 58; 76].

46.

Harrison told Appellant that if he would keep Bray "happy," Appellant could have a
team the following year. [R. 58].

47.

During the March 27, 2007meeting with Harrison, Appellant was never given any
type of official written documentation to support Bray's decision. [R. 58].

48.

Harrison also reviewed the list of seven reasons with Appellant that Bray had
provided him as the basis for her decision to prohibit Appellant from coaching
basebaU. [R. 58-59, 76].

49.

Appellant disputed the characterization of his actions, and argued that Harrison never
investigated Bray's accusations to determine their accuracy. Appellant also noted that
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Lehi City had never provided prior written notice of any violation or basis for
termination prior to actual termination, and that he had no opportunity to for a
review hearing or other proceeding prior to his termination. [R. 56].
50.

Appellant contends that he was prohibited from serving as a volunteer baseball coach
because he voiced concerns to his superiors over issues of fairness concerning the
youth participants and how the program was being run. Appellant also argues that he
was prohibited from serving as a volunteer baseball coach in an effort to limit his
speech concerning the administration of a publicly organized program and to retaliate
against Appellant for engaging in speech on a matter of public concern. [R. 305].

51.

The list of seven instances prepared by Bray clearly indicates that one reason
Appellant was expressly prohibited from volunteering as a baseball coach was
because he "started a petition concerning the recreation programs (sports) in Lehi
[and] tried to get signatures at the ballpark." [R. 57, 183].

52.

In fact, after Harrison informed Appellant that he would be prohibited from
coaching baseball, he warned Appellant not to start a petition because petitions were
"a sign of weakness." Appellant was prohibited from coaching Lehi City baseball
because he had engaged in lawful speech concerning the fair administration of the
baseball program and other safety matters. [R. 53, 55].

53.

Bray and Harrison acted in a manner that tarnished and impeached Appellant's
integrity, virtue, and reputation within the community. [R. 55].

54.

The other reasons cited by Bray and Harrison for prohibiting Appellant's
involvement with the baseball program were either fabricated, exaggerated, or
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pretextual. Appellant believes the motivations were pre-textual insofar as he was
permitted to continue coaching basketball and football while being denied the
opportunity to coach baseball. Furthermore, Bray and Harrison explicitly referenced
their disapproval of Appellant's efforts to begin a petition. [R. 55-56].
55.

There was no attempt by Lehi City to investigate or verify Bray's accusations against
Appellant, and no file or documentation existed in support of those accusations prior
to or at the time Appellant was denied the 2007 volunteer opportunity. R. 54].

56.

Appellant filed a Verified Complaint in District Court September 6, 2007. [R. 20].

57.

The Complaint alleged 10 separate causes of action: (1) First Amendment Retaliation,
(2) Equal Protection, (3) Defamation, (4) Procedural Due Process - Liberty Interest,
(5) Procedural Due Process - Property Interest, (6) 42 U.S.C. §1983 Cause of Action,
(7) 42 U.S.C. §1988(b) Cause of Action, (8) Breach of Contract, (9) Equitable
Estoppel, and (10) Attorney Fees. [R. 3-13].
SUMMARY OF T H E A R G U M E N T

The trial court erroneously struck paragraphs from the affidavits of Bridgit Doyle,
James Johnston, Alan Paul, Joyce Olson, Sharon Johnston, Wayne Stanley Crump, and
Roger Dean. The paragraphs that were struck, however, were based upon personal
knowledge, show the existence of disputed fact, contain relevant information, and are
provided by competent witnesses, thereby satisfying the requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 56.
Furthermore, the trial court erred in determining that fact issues raised in Appellant's own
affidavit were immaterial.
The trial court erroneously determined that there was insufficient Tenth Circuit case
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law to support Appellant's contention that volunteers have similar or the same First
Amendment rights as public employees. The trial court failed to consider all facts detailed in
the leading Tenth Circuit case on the issue, Andersen v. McCotter, 100 F.3d 723 (10th Cir.
1996), which establishes that volunteers have the similar or the same constitutional
protections under the First Amendment.
The trial court erroneously determined that the individual Appellees were entided to
qualified immunity against Appellant's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims because volunteers do not
have clearly established First Amendment protections or a protectable interest in keeping
their volunteer jobs. Appellant argues, on the contrary, that volunteers do have such
protections and interests and that the individual Appellees violated Appellant's clearly
established constitutional rights of which a reasonable official would have known. Appellant
also argues that Appellant provided clearly established legal authority from the Tenth Circuit
to establish that he is entitled to First Amendment protection despite his volunteer status.
With respect to his Fourteenth Amendment violation claim, Appellant properly
established: (1) that he was treated differently from other similarly situated volunteers, and
(2) that Appellees had no rational basis for their disparate treatment in terminating his
baseball coaching position for the 2007 season. Appellant contends that Lehi City may be
held liable for the acts of its employees if it is established that those employees did violate
Appellant's constitutional rights.
Appellant argues that he had constitutionally protected liberty or property interests
sufficient to invoke Fourteenth Amendment rights; and if Appellant did have a liberty
and/or property interest in volunteer coaching, the trial court's failure to analyze and
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determine Appellant's procedural due process claim was erroneous.
If Appellant establishes his 42 U.S.C § 1983 claims, he would be entitled to attorney's
fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988(b).
Finally, Appellant asserts that the trial court improperly determined that his Amended
Notice of Claim did not strictly comply with Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401 of the
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah ("UGIA") because Appellant did not specifically list
"breach of contract" or "defamation" as causes of action. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401
does not require a claimant to list specific causes of action in the notice of claim.
ARGUMENT

1.

The trial court erred in striking certain portions of submitted affidavits in
support of Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Appellees* Motion for
Summary Judgmentbecause
the portions of the submitted affidavits complied
with the requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 56.
A.

Standard of Review.

Because there is no established standard for reviewing a decision striking affidavits,
the standard of review for the admission of evidence "varies depending on the type of
evidence at issue." In civil cases, where the evidence sought to be introduced does not raise
concerns of the type that have produced heightened standards of sensitivity, a trial court
decision to admit evidence is reviewed under a broad grant of discretion. In re General
Determination of Rights to Use ofAll Water, 982 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah, 1999).
B.

The trial court improperly excluded relevant affidavit testimony in favor
of Appellant's legal position.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) establishes the standard for summary judgment and provides in
relevant part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers
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to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Emphasis added).
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) further indicates:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
The bases upon which the trial court actually decided to strike certain portions of
affidavits favorable to Appellant (thus removing any potential material fact "in controversy"
and paving the way for summary judgment in favor of Appellees) are as follows: (1)
Appellant had made inappropriate comments in a public forum, (2) affidavit testimony
offered by witnesses favorable to the Appellees was relevant, and (3) affidavit testimony in
direct contradiction to Appellees' affidavits and in support of Appellant was immaterial.
Material facts in this case would be those that relate to: (1) Whether Appellant was
banned from the voluntary coaching program because he publically raised an issue of
concern about violations by the Lehi City in the sports program; (2) Whether Appellant, not
in his capacity as citizen, but in his capacity as coach, had a right to raise such issues as they
direcdy impacted the children who he coached, and the other children in the league in
general, who could not represent themselves; and (3) Whether Appellant expressed himself
inappropriately before children in violation of the rules so as to make his exclusion from
coaching appropriate. Evidence from witnesses with personal knowledge about any of these
three areas would be material.
Controversy cannot be "balanced" or "eliminated" by simply erasing one side of the
ledger. The purpose of trial is to grant a forum for legitimate controversies to be aired in the
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interest of justice. Summary judgment is only appropriate when, as a natural result of review,
it is determined that there is no controversy—not because of systematic elimination by the
trial court of sworn statements permitted under Rule 56 to establish the existence of two
opposing points of view.
In Drysdale v. Ford Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678 (Utah, 1997) the Utah Supreme Court
warned that such a practice could be the equivalent of dismissal by discovery sanction rather
than by a legitimate elimination of immaterial statements. In that case, the defendant (Ford
Motor Company) sought summary judgment because the plaintiff (Drysdale) did not retain
the wreck of his Ford vehicle that resulted from an accident based on what he called a defect
caused in the automobile by Ford Motor Company. Although Drysdale had no control over
the destruction of the remains of the vehicle, Ford Motor Company argued that the lack of
material evidence meant that Drysdale could not establish his claim in any case.
After concluding that the trial court mistakenly granted summary judgment for Ford
Motor Company under improper conditions, the Drysdale court advised that "|l]itigants
must be able to present their cases fully to the courts before judgment can be rendered
against them unless it is obvious from the evidence before the court that the party opposing
judgment can establish no right to recovery." Id. at 680. (Internal citations and emphasis
omitted). In Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17,1J24, 42 P.3d 379, the court
reiterated that "[a] trial court is not authorized to weigh facts in deciding a summary
judgment motion, but is only to determine whether a dispute of material fact exists."
As will be discussed, the trial court in the instant case impermissibly weighed facts
and then relied upon those facts in deciding to grant summary judgment in favor of
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Appellees.
C.

The affidavits submitted on behalf of Appellant comply with Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(e) and are otherwise admissible.

When considering the admissibility of the affidavit testimony provided on behalf of
Appellant (and submitted for purposes of opposing summary judgment) it is clear the trial
court erred in striking those paragraphs where the affiant had personal knowledge, the
evidence was admissible, and the affiant was competent. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). Only in
the presence of a clear violation in form and substance against this Rule 56(e) would the trial
court be justified in striking portions of the affidavits.

L

Appellant's personal affidavit was material to the legal issues
presented.

In considering Appellant's personal affidavit, the trial court noted that "[m]uch of the
affidavit is direcdy contradictory to the many affidavits of Defendants." [R. 453]. Specifically,
Appellant's affidavit contains denials that he ever yelled or cursed in front of players,
umpires, etc. In spite of Appellant's counter-testimony, though, the trial court determined
that "the fact issues raised in Plaintiffs affidavits are not material to the analysis and
determination of this case, and ... Defendants are entided to summary judgment as a matter
of law." [R. 454]. No violation of form is cited; the trial court merely deemed all of
Appellant's affidavit statements "immaterial."
Utah R. Evid. 401 defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 402
provides that "all relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
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Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by
these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state."
Utah R. Civ. P 56(e) provides that: "[supporting and opposing affidavits shall be
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence,
and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein."
Appellant's affidavit was: (1) made on personal knowledge, (2) factually admissible in
accord with Rules 401 and 402, and (3) shows that affiant is competent to testify.
By complying with the above-standards, it must next be determined why the trial
court deemed the factual issues raised in Appellant's affidavit immaterial.
Appellee principal defense in justifying Appellant's termination as a volunteer coach
was that Appellant exhibited abusive behavior including yelling, cursing, and fighting with
umpires, scorekeepers, and opposing coaches and that such behavior violated the Volunteer
Code of Conduct. [R. 240, 331-350]. However, Appellant's affidavit is replete with
statements defending himself from these accusations. [R. 304-309].
The trial court appears to have forgotten that the primary controversy raised by the
case is not "whether Lehi City was justified in restricting Appellant from continuing to
volunteer as coach" (although this may be a defense); rather it is a controversy about
whether Appellant was improperly and illegally banned because he publically brought to light
the truth about the improper behavior of certain Lehi City officials in the operation of the
recreational programs involving youth baseball teams that cheated the youth, violated the
Code of Conduct, and compromised the integrity of the programs.
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Appellant's volunteer track record stretching back to 1981 without prior dismissal or
a demonstrated record of complaints, stands as a foundation as to the veracity of the
statements made by Appellant in his supporting affidavit. The Appellees' efforts to remove
Appellant from the volunteer position only after he complained about the changes in the
recreational program (and to action against those changes) support Appellant's contention
that the attempt to ban him from coaching really had nothing to do with any alleged
behavior in front of players, spectators, or with umpires; it was indeed a reaction of certain
individuals acting under a bureaucratic pretense to guard against public disclosure of their
actions.
Among other things, Appellant's affidavit directly counters the principal allegations of
the individual Appellees (and witness Kimberly Martinez) that Appellant was verbally
abusive, threatening, and used inappropriate language in front of the youth participants,
coaches, umpires or other staff members. [R. 304-309]. Why the trial court deemed
Appellant's entire affidavit statement "immaterial" is never explained in the March 23, 2010
Ruling. The trial court fails to recognize that Appellant's affidavit is highly material insofar as
it direcdy rebuts many of the Appellees' allegations—allegations that form the basis for the
pretext that Appellant was terminated as a coach for reasons other than exercising his right to
speak publicly about the baseball program. If the trial court was willing to accept the entirety
of the affidavit testimony submitted by Appellees in support of their Motion for Summary
Judgment as material to the legal issues, it should have done the same for Appellant.
Conversely, if all of the factual matters asserted in Appellant's affidavit (matters direcdy
relating to Appellant's behavior, attitude, interactions, rationale for objecting to certain
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procedures, tangible benefits derived from coaching, etc.) are "immaterial" to the legal
issues, then all of Appellees' affidavit statements relating to those same matters should be
deemed immaterial as well.

iL

The other affidavits offered in support of Appellant's
Memorandum in Opposition are admissible and should not
have been stricken.

The trial court erred in striking portions of affidavits submitted by various individuals
in support of Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
The affidavits (marked Exhibits 2 through 8 to the Memorandum in Opposition [R. 277-302])
were based upon personal knowledge, show the existence of disputed facts, contain relevant
information and were provided by competent witnesses—thus satisfying the requirements of
Utah R. Civ. P. 56.
The particular statements stricken by the trial court were not based on unsubstantiated
beliefs, but on observations based upon personal firsthand knowledge and should have been
considered as evidence. The statements contained in the affidavits raise genuine issues of
material fact as to the specific circumstances surrounding Appellant's actions and behaviors
as a coach. The witnesses who provided affidavits were competent do so and the foundation
for their knowledge was established by their participation in the Lehi City's baseball program
that enabled them to acquire firsthand knowledge of material issues at dispute in this case.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in striking relevant statements in the following
affidavits for the following reasons:
(1)

Affidavit of Bridgit Doyle: Paragraph 8 is not based on hearsay but firsthand

knowledge founded upon active participation in the matter and personal observation of the
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conduct. Paragraph 10 is substantiated by the affiant's personal observation of conduct, it
can be considered for impeachment purposes, and is direcdy relevant to counter allegations
made by Appellees. Paragraph 11 is not hearsay but alleges facts based on personal
knowledge that is direcdy probative of material issues. Paragraphs 12-15 are direct assertions
of material facts witnessed firsthand. Paragraphs 16-17 direcdy contradict material facts
alleged and relied upon by Appellees in justifying their removal of Appellant from his
coaching position.
(2)

Affidavit of James Johnston: Paragraph 8 is not hearsay but is based on firsthand

knowledge founded upon active participation in the matter and personal observation.
Paragraph 10 is based on personal observation of conduct, can be rightly considered for
impeachment purposes, and is direcdy relevant to the substance of Appellees' opposing
testimony. Paragraph 11 is not hearsay but alleges facts based on personal knowledge that is
direcdy probative of material issues. Paragraphs 12-15 contain direct assertions of material
facts witnessed firsthand. Paragraphs 16-17 are relevant as direcdy contradicting material
facts alleged and relied upon by Appellees.
(3)

Affidavit of Alan Paul: Paragraph 7 is not hearsay, is based upon firsthand knowledge

and has a factual foundation as established in paragraphs 1-3 of the affidavit. Paragraph 8 is
not hearsay, but based on firsthand knowledge founded upon active participation in the
matter and personal observation of the conduct. Paragraph 10 can be righdy considered for
impeachment purposes and is directly relevant to the substance of contradictory statements
provided by Appellees. Paragraphs 11-13 are direct assertions of material facts witnessed
firsthand.
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(4)

Affidavit of Joyce Olson: Paragraph 8 is not hearsay but is based on firsthand

knowledge founded upon active participation in the matter and personal observation of the
conduct. Paragraph 9 is not hearsay but alleges facts based on personal knowledge that are
directly probative of material issues. Paragraph 10 is substantiated by personal observation
of the conduct, and can be rightly considered for impeachment purposes.
(5)

Affidavit of Sharon Johnson: Paragraph 8 is not hearsay but is based on firsthand

knowledge founded upon active participation in the matter and personal observation of the
conduct.
(6)

Affidavit of Stanley Crump: Paragraph 7 is not hearsay but is based upon firsthand

knowledge and the opinion stated is has a factual foundation as established in Paragraph 3.
(7)

Affidavit of Roger Dean: Paragraph 6 is not hearsay but alleges facts based on

personal knowledge that is directly probative of material issues.
The trial court's striking of the foregoing statements from the affidavits submitted in favor
of Appellant's position was an abuse of discretion insofar as there was insufficient legal basis
to do so. Accordingly, Appellant asks this Court to reverse the trial court's decision to strike
these particular affidavit statements.
2.

The trial court erred in determining that Appellant had illegally protectable
interest in his position as a volunteer coach.
A.

Standard of Review.

A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when "there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah
R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing the appropriateness of a grant of summary judgment, this
Court views "the facts in a light most favorable to the losing party below" and gives "no
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deference to the trial court's conclusions of law: those conclusions are reviewed for
correctness." Blue Cross &Blue Shield v. State of Utah, 779 P.2d 634, 636-37 (Utah 1989);
Goodnow v. Sullivan, 2002 UT 21, \ 1, 44 P.3d 704.
B.

The Trial Court's Analysis.

The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment against Appellant on all of his
constitutional-based claims on the following grounds (which are set forth here in the order
in which the trial court presented in its March 23, 2010 Ruling):
(1)

Appellant was not a public employee. Appellant was a volunteer who had no legally
protectable interest in youth coaching. [R. 451-452].

(2)

Because Appellant had no legally protectable interest, the individual defendants sued in the
case (Harrison, Bray, Mackintosh) have qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit because such
immunity inheres if the individual(s)' conduct "does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Here, it was not
"clearly established" that Appellant had a statutory or constitutional right to continue in his
volunteer position as a coach, and Harrison, Bray and Mackintosh could not have known of
such a right even assuming arguendo that the right to volunteer as a coach was legally
protectable. [R. 451].

3)

Cases outside the Tenth Circuit are not relevant in determining whether a volunteer can ever
claim a legally protectable interest in his or her position. Because there are no Tenth Circuit
cases clearly on point on the question of whether a volunteer has a legally protectable
interest, Appellant has failed to provide sufficiently clear authority in support of such a
proposition. [R. 450].
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4)

Appellant's Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection cause of action is premised on
Appellant's argument that he was engaged in First Amendment protected speech, but was
treated differently than other similarly situated coaches. However, Appellant has not shown
he was treated differently than other similarly situated coaches. Even assuming Appellant
was treated differently, Appellant has also not shown that Lehi City did not have "rational
basis for the difference in treatment." [R. 450].

(5)

Because none of the individual Lehi City employees violated any constitutional rights
Appellant may have had, Lehi City cannot be held liable for any alleged violation of
Appellant's constitutional rights. [R. 449].

(6)

Appellant did not have a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. Appellant did
not receive monetary or other tangible benefits from coaching. [R. 449].

(7)

Having concluded that Appellant had no liberty or property interest in volunteer coaching,
the trial court need not analyze Appellant's claims for denial of procedural due process. [R.
448].

(8)

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) is not a separate cause of action, but only allows the trial court discretion
to award attorney's fees to a prevailing party in certain federally created actions (e.g. § 1983).
Because the trial court dismissed Appellant's § 1983 action, no basis exists under § 1988(b)
for any award of fees.
Appellant will address each of these grounds in order.
C.

Appellant had a legally protectable interest in his position despite his
"volunteer" status.

In dismissing Appellant's constitutional-based claims, the trial court first determined
that under applicable Tenth Circuit case law, Appellant had no legally protectable interest in
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volunteer youth coaching. [R. 451-452]. The trial court based its decision on language found
in the leading case on the matter, Andersen v. McCotter, 100 F.3d 723 (10th Cir. 1996).1
One of the central questions addressed by the Andersen court was whether the
plaintiff (Ms. Andersen) was strictly a volunteer, or whether she was a public employee. Id. at
726. After weighing a variety of factors2 and reviewing Utah's statutory definitions of the
terms "employee" and "volunteer," the Andersen court ultimately concluded that "Ms.
Andersen was not a volunteer—she was obviously a government employee." Id.
In reaching the conclusion that Appellant was not entitled to First Amendment
protection to voice his opinions about league policies because he had no legally protectable
interest as a volunteer, the trial court in the instant case focused on the distinction that the
plaintiff in Andersen received some monetary compensation and educational credit, while the
Appellant was unpaid. [R. 451-452]. Appellant acknowledges this distinction; but the trial
court utterly failed to recognize the clear position of the Andersen court that even unpaid
volunteers are entitled to First Amendment protection:
When acting as a sovereign, the government may not, in the absence of
justification, restrict an individual's right to speak freely on matters of public
1

Ms. Andersen was an intern with Utah Department of Corrections who sought injunctive
relief against the Department and monetary relief against various corrections officials,
claiming that she was fired in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment free speech
rights after publicly criticizing proposed changes in the Department's sex-offender treatment
program. Andersen, 100 F.3d at 725.
2
The Andersen court found that though she was an intern, Ms. Andersen was compensated
for her services; she was paid for twenty hours of work per week by the Board of Pardons
and received a nonmonetary benefit in the form of educational credit in exchange for her
continued participation in the State program. The court noted that Ms. Andersen worked
under the direction of officials at the Bonneville Community Corrections Center, and was
subject to their control. Finally, the fact that Ms. Andersen's employment position was
terminable at will did not diminish her First Amendment claim. Andersen, 100 F.3d at 726.
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import, nor may the government indirectly exert leverage to suppress speech
by unconstitutionally tying the receipt of benefits to the speaker's coerced
silence. We hold that Ms. Andersen's termination from her employment
position as an intern with the DOC because of her public comment on the
DOC's proposed changes in the sex-offender treatment program implicated
her First Amendment rights, and invoked the protections afforded by the
Pickering balancing test. However, even if we accepted Defendants'
arguments and considered Ms. Andersen a nonpaid volunteer, her claim
would not be defeated. Defendants argue that volunteers are not
entitled to First Amendment protection under Pickering. We disagree.
The exercise of free speech rights is not dependent upon the receipt of a
full-time salary. "[0]ur modern 'unconstitutional conditions' doctrine holds
that the government 'may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
infringes his constitutionally protected ... freedom of speech'...." Board of
County CommWs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, — , 116 S.Ct. 2342, 2347,135 L.Ed.2d
843 (1996) (quoting Perry, 408 U.S. at 597, 92 S.Ct. at 2697). For example, the
Court has recognized a variety of benefits which cannot be denied solely
because of the exercise of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Rutan, 497 U.S. at 7273, 110 S.Ct. at 2735-36 (promotion or transfer in a government job); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1327 n. 6, 22 L.Ed.2d 600
(1969) (welfare benefits); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-05, 83 S.Ct.
1790, 1794-95, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (unemployment benefits); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1341-42, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958)
(tax exemptions). (Emphasis added).
Andersen, 100 F.3d at 727.
The Andersen court's disagreement with the proposition that volunteers are not
entitled to First Amendment protection under Pickering is direct and unqualified. In fact, the
entire tone of the Andersen decision is one that recognizes that significant weight must be
given to broader constitutional principles when considering actions that inhibit free speech.
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a
person has no "right" to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the
government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are
some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected
interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government
could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected
speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be
penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to produce a result
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which [it] could not command direcdy. Such interference with constitutional
rights is impermissible (internal citations omitted).
Andersen, 100 F.3d at 726-27.
The Andersen court even goes to pains (contra the position of the defendants in that
case) to reference other cases where volunteers have the same First Amendment protections
to free speech as an employee. Andersen, 100 F.3d at 726-27. (See Hj/and P. Wonder, 972 F.2d
1129, 1136 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that volunteer status is a valuable governmental benefit
or privilege that may not be denied on the basis of constitutionally protected speech); cert,
denied, 508 U.S. 908, 113 S.Ct. 2337, 124 L.Ed.2d 248 (1993); Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer
Fire Dep% 607 F.2d 17, 25 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that the dismissal of a volunteer firefighter
for complaining about low morale and inadequate training and discipline can violate.the First
Amendment)).
The Supreme Court has stated that the type of sanction imposed "need not be
particularly great in order to find that rights have been violated." Elrod v. Burns, All U.S.
347, 359 n. 13, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2683 n. 13, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). Appellant's status as a
volunteer is the type of role that constitutes the type of governmental benefit or privilege the
deprivation of which can trigger First Amendment protection. The trial court focused
exclusively (and wrongly) on the fact that Appellant was unpaid for his volunteer efforts. In
fact, Appellant had volunteered since 1981 and gained valuable experience and education
while administering his duties with the youth baseball team. This opportunity to serve also
provided Appellant with the satisfaction of giving something back to the public. Even if the
trial court considered these trivialities, they were very important benefits in the eyes of the
Appellant.
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D.

Appellees Bray and Harrison are not entitled to "qualified immunity"
against Appellant's claim for violation of his First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.
L

The qualified immunity standard.

Qualified immunity is "an affirmative defense to be asserted by a government official
performing discretionary functions. It is premised on the contention that the challenged
conduct was undertaken in good faith or did not violate clearly established law or
constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800,102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).
In assessing a defense of qualified immunity, a court must determine the objective
reasonableness of the challenged conduct by reference to the law clearly established at the
time of the constitutional violation. Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 696 (10th Cir.1990), cert,
denied, 499 U.S. 976, 111 S.Ct. 1622,113 L.Ed.2d 719 (1991). The burden rests with the
plaintiff to come forward with facts or allegations to show the violation of a clearly
established right. Id.; Hannula v. City o/Lakewood, 907 F.2d 129,131 (10th Cir.1990).
iL

The trial court's analysis of qualified immunity.

In the case at bar, the trial court determined in conclusory fashion that the language
in Andersen v. McCotter, 100 F.3d 723 (10th Cir. 1996) (which affirms that a volunteer would
be afforded First Amendment protections) was "dicta" and did not create a "clearly
established" constitutional right for the purpose of Appellant's § 1983 claims. [R. 451]. As a
result, the trial court concluded that there was no way that the individual Appellees could
have knowingly violated any constitutional right that Appellant might have had.
Of course, the trial court's conclusion rests wholly upon the premise that the Andersen
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decision was insufficient to establish the principle that volunteers have a legally protectable
interest in maintaining their jobs and that volunteers are protected from government
reprisals when they exercise First Amendment rights. Appellants have already argued in
section 2(c) of this brief that the Andersen decision (as well as Supreme Court and other
federal circuit court cases), clearly establishes that volunteers have a legally protectable
interest when they engage in First Amendment-covered free speech. If this Court determines
that the Andersen ruling clearly establishes such a principle, then the trial court's premise is
faulty, and the question of whether the individual Appellees have a legitimate "qualified
immunity" defense is "back on the table."
Without citing any affidavit or other factual testimony, the trial court finished its
analysis with this pronouncement: "No reasonable governmental official would have
recognized that not selecting [Appellant] to serve as a volunteer baseball could would have
violated [Appellant's] constitutional rights" [R. 450]. While convenient, this type of "endgame" ultimate ruling is premature and legally inappropriate given the fact-sensitive nature
of the case and that the issue was being considered under a summary judgment standard.
The heart of Appellant's complaint was that the Appellees wrongfully deprived him of a
volunteer position specifically because he raised concerns about changes in the recreational
program (which Appellant believed affected the fairness and well-being of the youth
participants). The motives and behaviors of the Appellees are highly relevant, and an inquiry
into their motives and behaviors is highly fact-sensitive. The trial court mistakenly placed
itself in the position of a "reasonable government official" and granted summary judgment
without allowing Appellant the full and fair opportunity to vindicate his theory through
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deposition or trial
E.

Appellant provided appropriate authority from the Tenth Circuit to
establish that he is entitled to First Amendment protection even though
he was a volunteer.

The trial court correctly noted the standard a plaintiff must meet in order overcome
the "qualified immunity defense" and prove that a "clearly established law" was in effect at
the time the alleged § 1983 violation occurred. In its analysis, the trial court referred to Foote
v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416,1424 (10th Cir. 1997). The relevant paragraph from Foote indicates:
When a § 1983 defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity on
summary judgment, the plaintiff must show the law was clearly established
when the alleged violation occurred and must come forward with sufficient
facts to show the official violated that clearly established law. The defendant
bears the normal summary judgment burden of showing no material facts that
would defeat the qualified immunity defense remain in dispute. For the law to
be clearly established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit
decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other
courts must be as plaintiff maintains. V-1 Oil Co. v. Means, 94 F.3d 1420, 1423
(10 h Cir.l996).
The trial court then simply announced that the Andersen decision was not "on point"
and that Appellant had not shown by the clear weight of extra-judicial authority that a
volunteer would be entitled to First Amendment protections on par with a public employee.
[R. 450].
This is an incorrect assessment of the law and the presentation of the law set forth in
Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Appellees' Motion for Summary judgment that was
before the trial court. In the Memorandum in Opposition, Appellant detailed the holding in
Andersen (a Tenth Circuit case) and cited to Supreme Court and other federal circuit court
decisions that directly support Appellant's contention that volunteers have a protectable
First Amendment right to free speech. [R. 325-326].
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As a volunteer, Appellant received non-monetary benefits and was improperly
dismiss from his position for exercising his First Amendment rights by bringing to light the
improper operation of recreational programs in Lehi City.
It is unclear of what further degree of judicial authority the trial court was asking
Appellant to invoke. The Andersen court left no doubt as to the fact that unpaid volunteers
would be entitled to First Amendment protection, and the authority cited in that decision
(Second and Ninth Circuit Courts and the United States Supreme Court) affirms the general
principle that a governmental entity may revoke a volunteer's position on a basis that
infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of
speech.
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to consider the judicial authority presented
by Appellant, to find that a volunteer's First Amendment rights are protectable and to
reverse the trial court's legal conclusion.
F.

For purposes of his Fourteenth Amendment violation claim, Appellant
has established: (1) that he was treated differently from other similarly
situated volunteers, and (2) that Appellees had no rational basis for the
disparate treatment.
The "purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is

to secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper
execution through duly constituted agents." Village ofWillowhrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564
120 S.Ct. 1073,145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000).
The United States Supreme Court has recently held that "a plaintiff need not be a
member of a traditionally 'protected class' in order to allege an equal protection violation."
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Tuskowski v. Griffin, 359 F.Supp.2d 225 (D.Conn.2005); see also Harvey v. Mark, 352
F.Supp.2d 285, 290 (D.Conn.2005). Rather, a plaintiff may maintain a "class of one" equal
protection claim, as long as the plaintiff alleges that he or she was treated differendy than
similarly situated persons, and there was no rational basis for that differential treatment. Id.
(citing Village ofWillowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. at 564,120 S.Ct. 1073).
Appellant is able to show that Appellees treated him differently than others similarly
situated and that there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment. For example,
during the 2006 season, Appellant acted no differently than any other similarly situated youth
baseball coaches in Lehi, and Appellant did not engage in any conduct that violated the
Volunteer Code of Conduct. [R. 304-309].
Importandy, the Harrison instructed Bray to create an "incident" list after Appellant
publicly agitated for changes to the baseball programs drafting procedures. The various
incident reports ultimately created by "witnesses" against Appellant were not even in
existence during the 2006 season and are clearly after the fact rationalizations used to justify
and support Harrison and Bray's decision to exclude Appellant from coaching for the 2007
youth baseball season.
Appellant's equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated
by Bray and Harrison because Appellant's conduct was the same as any other coach in the
league yet Appellant was arbitrarily and capriciously singled out for disparate treatment.
G.

If individual Lehi City employees did violate Appellant's constitutional
rights, Appellee Lehi City may be held liable for said violations.

After determining that none of the individual Appellees violated any of Appellant's
rights, the trial court concluded that Appellee Lehi City could not be held vicariously liable
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for any alleged constitutional violations. [R. 449]. Appellant agrees with the general principle
relied upon by the trial court in reaching its conclusion ("A municipality may not be held
liable where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers." Camuglia
v. City of Albuquerque, 448 F.3d 1214, 1223 (10th Cir. 2006)). However, if this Court finds that
summary judgment was improperly granted as to Appellant's § 1983 claims, Lehi City's
liability would become an open issue that would be determined only after further
proceedings in the trial court.
H.

Appellant did have constitutionally protected property and liberty
interests even though he did not receive monetary benefits from
coaching.

"The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of
interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property."
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). "To have a
property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or
desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it." Id. at 577. Property
interests (as opposed to liberty interests) are not created by the Constitution, but by existing
rules or understandings that stem from independent sources, "such as state law-rules or
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits." Id. at 577. See also, Darrv. Town ofTelluride, 495 F.3d 1243, 1251 (10th Cir. 2007).
The Supreme Court has found that implied contracts for continued employment can
implicate procedural due process safeguards. See Connellv. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 208,
91 S.Ct. 1772,1773, 29 L.Ed.2d 418; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-602, 92 S.Ct.
2694, 2699-2700, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S.Ct. 2074,
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2077, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976).
The trial court, in the instant case, granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees
and against Appellant on his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation
claims because: (1) Appellant received no monetary or other tangible benefits from coaching
[R. 449], and (2) Appellee Bray's two statements confirming that Appellant would be
coaching a youth baseball team in the 2007 year did not create an actual legal entitlement to a
volunteer position in 2007.
As to the trial court's first point: while there is no dispute that Appellant did not
receive financial compensation for his volunteer service, there is absolutely no factual basis
for the contention that Appellant received no other tangible benefit from coaching. In
making such an assertion, the trial court is engaging in pure, subjective speculation. There
can be no question that Appellant received many tangible benefits (even if non-monetary in
nature) by participating as a volunteer coach. Furthermore, the trial court cites no legal
authority for its suggestion that a tangible benefit must be one of a monetary nature under a
Fourteenth Amendment "property interest" deprivation analysis.
As to the trial court's second point: if Bray verbally promised Appellant on two
different occasions that he would be allowed to coach a baseball team in 2007, then there
was certainly an implied agreement in place and a reasonable expectation by Appellant that
he would be coaching in 2007. Appellant's volunteer status does not diminish the fact that
an express oral contract was formed when Bray made the commitment to Appellant.
The liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments encompasses an individual's freedom to work and earn a living. If in the
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course of dismissing an employee, the government takes steps or makes charges that so
severely stigmatize the employee that she cannot avail herself of other employment
opportunities, a claim for deprivation of liberty will stand. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. at 57374, 92 S.Ct. at 2707-08.
Appellant has been seriously burdened in that he has been deprived of the
opportunity of coaching his son in this setting, the Lehi baseball team; a setting where
Appellant's roots that go back a generation.
I.

If Appellant did have a liberty and/or property interest in volunteer
coaching, the trial court's failure to analyze and determine Appellant's
procedural due process claim was erroneous.

Because the trial court concluded that Appellant had no liberty or property interests
in volunteer coaching youth baseball teams, the trial court did not feel obligated to address
Appellant's claim of procedural due process violations. [R. 448]. If this Court reverses the
trial court's decision and finds that Appellant did have a liberty or property interest in
volunteering as a coach, the trial court should be required to address Appellant's claim of
procedural due process violations.
J.

If the trial court is reversed and Appellant establishes his § 1983 claim,
an award of attorney's fees under § 1988 could be awarded in the trial
court's discretion.
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) authorizes courts to award attorney's fees to the prevailing

party in any action or proceeding to enforce provisions of a variety of federally created
statutes, including 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Should this Court reverse the trial court's decision as to
the dismissal of Appellant's § 1983 claim, Appellant would be entitied to renew his request
for attorney's fees under § 1988(b).
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3^

The trial court erred granting Summary Judgment in favor of Appellees by
dismissing Appellant's defamation and breach of contract causes of action on
the basis that Appellant did not reference such causes of action in his
Amended Notice of Claim.
A.

Standard of review.

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court views "the facts in a
light most favorable to the losing party below" and gives "no deference to the trial's
conclusions of law: those conclusions are reviewed for correctness." Schurt^ v. BMW ofN.
Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991); Blue Cross &Blue Shield v. State of Utah, 119 P.2d 634,
636-37 (Utah 1989); Goodnow v. Sullivan, 2002 UT 21, \ 1, 44 P.3d 704.
B.

Appellant was not required to list specific causes of action in the notice
of claim in order to preserve those causes of action.

The trial court dismissed Appellant's causes of action for defamation, breach of
contract, and equitable estoppel on grounds that Appellant's Amended Notice of Claim fails to
reference those causes of action in the "Nature of the Claim" section.3 [R. 446-447].
In reaching its decision, the trial court indicated that Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7401(3) (a) (ii) requires that "[t]he notice of claim shall set forth... the nature of the claim
asserted." The trial court also referenced Cedar Prof I Pla^a L.C v. Cedar City Corp., 2006 UT
App 36, If 9,131 P.3d 275 in acknowledging that the UGIA does not require a listing of
"each specific cause of action that might be pleaded."
Nevertheless, in the instant case, the trial court dismissed the three causes of action
because "...no information in the AmendedNotice of Claim apprises Lehi City of its potential
liability for out-of-the-blue claims such as defamation or breach of contract." [R. 447]. Citing
3

Appellant does not appeal the dismissal of the equitable estoppel cause of action.
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the "strict compliance" language from Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109, f 12, 37
P.3d 1156 and Heideman v. Washington City, 2007 UT App 11, f 14, 155 P.3d 900, the trial
court found that Appellant's failed to "strictly comply" with the notice requirement because
there was no information contained in the Amended Notice of Claim that would "apprise" Lehi
City of possible defamation and/or breach of contract claims. [R. 446-447].
On appeal, Appellant asserts that there is direct conflict between the rulings in the
Cedar Prof I Pla^a L.C and Heideman cases and that the ruling in the Cedar Prof I Pla^a L.C
case should apply and the trial court's dismissal of Appellant's defamation and breach of
contract claims.

L

The plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401(3)(a)(ii) and relevant case
law interpreting that section does not require an aggrieved party to list all
specific causes of action it might have in the notice of claim.

It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that courts should consider
the plain meaning of a statute's language. "Under our established rules of statutory
construction, we look first to the plain meaning of the pertinent language in interpreting [a
statute]; only if the language is ambiguous do we consider other sources for its meaning."
Fla. Asset Fin. Corp. v. Utah Labor Comm'n, 2006 UT 58, | 9, 147 P.3d 1189.
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401(3)(a)(ii) requires that a notice of claim contain four
elements.4 The second required element that a claimant must provide in the notice of claim
is "the nature of the claim asserted." Importantly, the statutory language does not require a
4

The four elements are: (1) a brief statement of the facts; (2) the nature of the claim
asserted; (3) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known; and (4) if the
claim is being pursued against a governmental employee individually as provided in Utah
Code Ann. § 63G-7-202(3)(c), the name of the employee.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

claimant to include "all legal claims/' "all causes of action" or any other enumeration of
specific or particular theories or claims. All that is required is for a claimant to indicate the
"nature" of the claim.
It is also significant that the word "claim" is singular. Claimants need not list "claims"
or "causes of action," but only indicate the nature of the claim. This sort of broad and general
language is mirrored in the first and third elements required for a notice of claim. The first
element is a "brief statement of facts and the third element is the damages incurred by the
claimant "insofar as they are known." Claimants are not required to provide a litany of facts
or ascertain all potential damages resulting from a governmental entity's (or employee's)
actions.
While the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that claimants must "strictly comply"
with the requirements of the UGIA (see Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109, Tf 12, 37
P.3d 1156), this directive does not speak to the matter of how those individual requirements should
be construed or interpreted. It is a fallacy to argue that broad mandate of "strict compliance" with
UGIA's requirements somehow means that the words "nature of the claim" require a
claimant to list all possible causes of actions or claims. What is at issue in this particular case
is not the broader rule of "strict compliance" but how a claimant can conceivably articulate
the "nature of the claim" in a notice of claim without categorically listing each cause of
action. To state that strict compliance is required says nothing about how a claimant strictly
complies with a particular requirement.
Unfortunately, the Heideman decision does nothing to provide clarity on the matter;
and, when read in its plainest terms, appears to contradict the ruling in Cedar Prof I Pla^a L.C.
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In Cedar Prof7Pla^a L.C., the court specifically allowed the plaintiff to maintain a direct
negligence claim against the defendant city despite the fact that the effective notice of claim
only contained an allegation of negligent supervision of contractors by the city and not a
claim of direct negligence. In reaching this decision, the court specifically ruled: "Nothing in
the Act requires a claimant to set forth in the notice of claim each specific cause of action
that might be pleaded against the government entity. Rather, the Act requires only that the
notice of claim include 'a brief statement of the facts/ 'the nature of the claim asserted/ and
'the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known.'" (Internal citations
omitted). Cedar Prof I Pla^a L.C, 2006 UT App 36, % 9.
In Houghton v. Department ofHealth 2005 UT 63,121,125 P.3d 860, the Utah Supreme
Court advised: "Although we have mandated strict compliance with the notice of claim
procedures, we have not required that such notices 'meet the standards required to state a
claim for relief.' Peeples v. State, 2004 UT App 328,111, 100 P.3d 254 (quoting Behrens v.
Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1183 (Utah 1983)). Rather, a plaintiff need only
include 'enough specificity in the notice to inform as to the nature of the claim so that the
defendant can appraise its potential liability.' Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah
1990)."
The Peeples decision is also instructive. In that case, the court was required to
determine whether the plaintiff strictly complied with the notice of claim requirements. The
defendant (the State of Utah) had argued that the plaintiffs one sentence statement of facts
was insufficient to meet the first element of the notice of claim requirement. In reversing the
lower court's dismissal of the plaintiffs claim for failure to provide a sufficiently detailed
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statement of the facts, the court made the following observation:
Having determined that the Act [the UGIA], while not a model of specific
clarity, is not ambiguous, our analysis turns to whether Peeples's notice strictly
complied with the Act. The strict compliance standard favors the State, and its
application often results in the barring of claims. See, e.g., Gurule, 2003 UT 25
at Tflf 4-8, 69 P.3d 1287 (barring claim when notice was not properly directed
to county clerk, even though notice was timely directed to county
commissioner); Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109,H 17> 37 p -3d 1156
(barring claim when notice was not properly directed to president or secretary
of UTA board, despite communications with and timely notice to claims
adjuster); Thimmes v. Utah State Univ., 2001 UT App 93,fflj 2, 6-7, 22 P.3d 257
(barring claim when notice directed to risk management rather than attorney
general). Strict compliance is not, however, a one-way street, and a claimant is
not required to do more than the Act clearly requires. Notice need not be
given to any person other than that directed by statute, even if that person's
awareness of the claim might facilitate investigation or settlement; notice
provided exactly one year after an injury arises is just as timely as notice
comfortably provided six months earlier; and so on. All that is required is
simple compliance, and there is no need for a claimant to exceed the Act's
requirements even if such action might more optimally accomplish the
purposes underlying the Act. Peeples, 2004 UT App 328, Tf 9.
The Peeples' court then cited the Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d
1179,1183 (Utah 1983) a drew a comparison between the UGIA and the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act to illustrate the quantum of information that should be
included in a notice of claim. The language is of particular import to Appellant's
argument in the instant matter:
Even if we were to view the brevity of Peeples's claim as a defect,
"defects in the form or content of notices of claim do not always act to
bar a claim." Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666, 669 (Utah Ct.App.1994); cf.
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1183 (Utah 1983);
Spencer v. Salt hake City, 17 Utah 2d 362, 412 P.2d 449, 450 (1966)
(finding sufficient *258 notice of claim despite failure to declare the
amount of damages as required by statute). We find the supreme
court's analysis of a similar provision within the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-1 to -17 (2002), to be
instructive:
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Defendant also argues that denial of the motion [to amend] was proper
because the proposed amendment set forth additional allegations and claims
outside the scope of plaintiffs notice of intent to sue, which had been filed
prior to commencement of this action. A notice of intent to sue, as required
by [Utah Code section 78-14-8 (2002) ], is not intended to be the equivalent of
a complaint and need not contain every allegation and claim set forth in the
complaint.... Although the notice must include "specific allegations of
misconduct on the part of the prospective defendant," that requirement does
not need to meet the standards required to state a claim for relief in a
complaint. The parties need to give only general notice of an intent to sue and
of the injuries then known and not a statement of legal theories (emphasis
added). Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1183.
Peeples, 2004 UT App 328, If 11.
Finally, the Peeples' court noted: "While the State may desire more information
than Peeples provided, that desire does not render Peeples's notice insufficient under
the plain language of the Act. Rather, the State may obtain the desired information
through formal discovery, informal communications with claimant's counsel, and/or
its own investigation. Alternatively, the legislature may choose, as it has in the past, to
require claimants to provide more specific facts in a notice of claim (internal footnote
and citations omitted). Id. at ^f 12.
While the statutory element at issue in Peeples was the "brief statement of
facts" element (rather than the "nature of the claim" element), the position taken by
the Peeples' court suggesting that a governmental entity may obtain additional desired
information the formal discovery, investigation, (etc.) is equally applicable to the
situations where the notice of claim may not contain every legal theory or cause of
action. The overall
Although the Utah Supreme Court has established a rule of strict compliance with the
notice provisions of the UGIA it has also held that:
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[A] statute is ... to be construed in light of its intended purpose. It is
necessary to consider the policy of the notice requirement so that in any
particular case the facts can be evaluated to determine if the intent of the
statute has been accomplished .... The primary purpose of a notice of claim
requirement is to afford the responsible public authorities an opportunity to
pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits of a claim and to arrive
at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding the expenditure of
public revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation (internal citations
omitted). Stahlv. Utah Transit Auth, 618 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1980).
In summary, Utah courts have indicated that:
(1)

Nothing in the UGIA requires a claimant to set forth in the notice of

claim each specific cause of action that might be pleaded against the government
entity. Cedar Prof I Pla^a L. C, 2006 UT App 36, If 9;
(2)

the notice of claim need not meet the standards required to state a claim

for relief. Houghton, 2005 UT 63, \ 21;
(3)

a claimant is not required to do more than the UGIA clearly requires.

Peoples, 2004 UT App 328, \ 9;
(4)

[By analogy to the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act], parties need to

give only general notice of an intent to sue and of the injuries then known and not a
statement of legal theories. Peeples, 2004 UT App 328, ^ 11.
In returning again to the Heideman decision, it is clear that the court in that case
upheld dismissal of one of the plaintiffs causes of actions for one reason and one reason
only: the plaintiff had not listed the cause of action in the notice of claim. The
problem, though, is that Utah courts have explicitly ruled that identifying and listing each
possible cause of action in the notice of claim is not required. Equally important is the fact
that the legislature could simply have required claimants to do so by including language to that
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effect in Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401(3)(a)(ii)—but the legislature did not do so.
As the Peep/es court acknowledged, the UGIA may not be a model of clarity, but it is
not ambiguous in that a claimant need only state the nature of the claim (and not specific
causes of actions or legal theories) in order to strictly comply. The Heideman decision resulted
in an extrapolation of the statutory "nature of the claim" requirement and is tantamount to a
judicially redefined (and constricted) interpretation of the requirement. No other conclusion
can be drawn from Heideman than that the failure to specifically name a particular cause of
action in the "nature of the claim" section results in a claimant forever forfeiting that claim.
Such a conclusion, however, is squarely at odds with other judicial authority in Utah and
with the statute itself.5
Ultimately, the strict "identify every specific cause of action or lose it" standard
seemingly established by the Heideman decision and the less strict standard articulated in
Cedar Prof I Pla^a L.C, Peep/es (and other cases) creates a "grey area" of ambiguity for
claimants. Must a claimant really list every potential cause of action/claim/legal theory/basis
for recovery in order ensure preservation of such for litigation? If not, what level of
particularity is actually required to set forth the "nature" of the claim? In light of the
Heideman decision, it appears that there is no clear answer.
Nevertheless, Appellant argues that a general description identifying the broader legal
implications of the alleged violation (when read in conjunction with the brief statement of
5

The Court may be inclined to "square" the Cedar Prof I Pla^a L.C, decision with Heideman
by rationalizing that the Cedar Prof I Pla^a L.C plaintiff at least mentioned the word
"negligence" in its third Notice of Claim (even though negligence was never asserted directly
against the defendant city). Appellant asserts that such a position is still incorrect insofar as it
would require a claimant to postulate and identify a specific legal theory or general cause of
action in the notice of claim—something the statute itself does not require.
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facts and a statement of potential damages) is sufficient to strictly comply with Utah Code
Ann. §63G-7-401(3)(a)(ii).
As argued in the next section, applying the strict Heideman standard can result in the
unfair forfeiture of legitimate claims that might only become known after the complaint has
been filed and discovery undertaken. Furthermore, such a strict standard effectively nullifies
the general provisions allowing for the amendment of pleadings under Utah R. Civ. P. 15.

\L

Requiring a claimant to list specific causes of action in the notice of
claim defeats the "justice" policy for allowing amended pleadings.

A narrow interpretation of the "nature of the claim" requirement in Utah Code Ann.
§ 63G-7-401(3)(a)(ii) that requires a claimant to identify all causes of action by name or risk
losing them wreaks havoc with the established principle that leave to amend pleadings
"shall be freely given when justice so requires." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). Utah courts have
accepted a liberal interpretation of Rule 15(a) "so as to allow parties to have their claims
fully adjudicated." Nune^ v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, K 19, 53 P.3d 2.
Additionally, the general rules of discovery as embodied in Utah's Rules of Civil
Procedure 26 through 37 contemplate that the process of formal discovery may result in the
revelation of claims that were initially unknown at the time a complaint was filed or in the
modification or elimination of other claims.
If claimants in a suit against a governmental entity are required to state with
specificity all causes of action in the notice of claim, they will be effectively foreclosed from
ever amending their pleadings even where a claimant may have been legitimately unaware of
a specific cause of action at the time the notice of claim was filed, or where such a cause of
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action is only revealed after litigation discovery has ensued. Such a result is unjust as a
policy matter and does not accord with the primary purpose of the notice of claim
requirement.
"|T]he primary purpose of the notice of claim requirement is to afford the
responsible public authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and timely investigation of
the merits of a claim and to arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding the
expenditure of public revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation." Stahlv. Utah Transit
Autk, 618 R2d 480, 482 (Utah 1980); see NuneZ v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, f 25.
Construing the "nature of the claim" requirement to mandate that all conceivable
causes of action be listed in particularity at the outset in the notice of claim turns Utah Code
Ann. § 63G-7-401(3)(a)(ii) into an unreasonable hurdle of exactitude and prescience for a
claimant.
Appellant included all causes of actions known to him at the time in his Amended
Notice of Claim. Moreover, Appellant indicated therein that there may be further causes of
action discovered during the course of the suit by including the language of "[o]ther
unknown causes of action." [R. 132]. Appellant also noted in his Amended Notice of Claim
that Harrison had changed positions in "contradiction to the previous representation" that
Appellant would be able to assist coaching the basketball team (a claim that could be
reasonably construed as a breach of contract claim). [R. 132].
The Amended'Notice of Claim contains approximately two pages of facts. In the "nature
of the claim" section, Appellant specifically advised Lehi City that "[t]he following legal
theories or causes of action may be asserted in whole or in part. The following list is not
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intended to be a complete summary of all legal theories that may eventually be asserted." [R.
132].
The trial court, notwithstanding, determined that Appellant's Amended Notice of Claim
was not "sufficiently specific" as to the nature of the claim asserted with respect to the
subsequent defamation and breach of contract causes of action appearing in the Complaint
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in applying such a rigid standard and that he
strictly complied with the "nature of the claim" element required by Utah Code Ann. §
63G-7-401(3)(a)(ii) by providing a description of the broad legal grounds on which he
would proceed if compelled to file suit. Accordingly, Appellant respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the trial court's dismissal of the defamation and breach of contract claims
on grounds that Appellant did not stricdy comply with Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7401(3)(a)(ii).
CONCLUSION

For the above-state reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the trial court's grant of Appellees' Motion to Strike and Motion for Summary Judgment on those
claims outlined herein.
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of November 2010.

JUSTIN D. HEIDEMAN,
& O L S E N , L.L.C.,
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant William A. Doyle
H E I D E M A N , MCKAY, H E U G L Y
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H
United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit
Jessica ANDERSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
O. Lane McCOTTER, in his official capacity as Executive Director of the Utah Department of Corrections; Gary Bortolussi; Katherine Ockey; Betty
Gaines-Jones; Raymond H. WahL Defendants-Appellees.
No. 95-4186.
Nov, 12, 1996,

310 Prisons
310V Officers and Employees
310k390 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 310k7)
University student receiving college credit and being paid for 20 hours of work per week as intern
with state Board of Pardons was entitled to First
Amendment protections recognized for public employees. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
[2| Federal Courts 170B €=>766

Intern with Utah Department of Corrections sought
injunctive relief against Department and monetary
relief against various corrections officials, claiming
that she was fired in retaliation for exercising her
First Amendment free speech rights. The United
States District Court for the District of Utah, Dee
Benson. J., granted summary judgment for defendants. Intern appealed. The Court of Appeals, Paul J.
Kelly, Jr.. Circuit Judge, held that: (1) intern was
entitled to First Amendment protection: (2) material
fact questions precluded summary judgment: and
(3) defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity.

170B Federal Courts
170BV1I1 Courts of Appeals
170BV1II(K) Scope, Standards, and Extent
170BVIH(K)1 In General
170Bk763 Extent of Review Dependent on Nature of Decision Appealed from
!70Bk766 k. Summary Judgment.
Most Cited Cases
When First Amendment is implicated, Court of Appeals reviewing grant of summary judgment is obligated to make independent examination of whole
record to ensure that judgment does not constitute
forbidden intrusion on field of free expression.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1: Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule
56(c), 28 U.S.C.A.

Reversed and remanded.

| 3 | Constitutional Law 92 € ^ 1 9 2 5

West Headnotes
f 11 Constitutional Law 92 € = > ! 181
92 Constitutional Law
92X First Amendment in General
92X(B) Particular Issues and Applications
92k! 180 Public Employees and Officials
92k 1181 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 92k82( II))

92 Constitutional Law
92XVTII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and
Press
92XVIIKP) Public Employees and Officials
92k 1925 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k90.1(7.2))
Whether individual is public employee or volunteer
for purposes of applying First Amendment guarantee of free speech is matter of state law, U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. i.
(4J Constitutional Law 92 €=?1501

Prisons 310 €^>390
92 Constitutional Law
92XVHI Freedom of Speech, Expression, and
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Press

Press

92XVHHA) In General
92XVIII(A)1 In General
92k 1501 k. Denial of Benefits. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k90.1 (I))

92XVIIHP) Public Employees and Officials
92k 1928 k. Retaliation in General. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k90.1(7.2))
Government employer can deny benefit of employment to employee who speaks out against it on matter of public concern only if it can show that such
speech adversely affects efficiency or effectiveness
of its operations, and that government's interest as
employer outweighs individual employee's interest
in particular speech. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. I.

Constitutional Law 92

€^1555

92 Constitutional Law
92XVIII Freedom of Speech. Expression, and
Press
92XVHI(A) In General
92XV!IUAh? Panicular Issues and Applications in General
92kI555 k. Matters of Public Concern.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k90.1(l))
When acting as sovereign, government may not absent justification, restrict individual's right to speak
freely on matters of public import, nor may government indirect!} Qx^rt leverage to suppress speech
by unconstitutionally tying receipt of benefits to
speaker's coerced silence. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. I.
| 5 | Constitutional Law 92 € ^ > I 5 4 5
92 Constitutional Law
92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and
Press
92XVIIKA) In General
92XVIli(A)3 Particular issues and Applications in General
92k 1545 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 92k90.1(1))
Unpaid government volunteers are entitled to First
Amendment protection; exercise of free speech
rights is not dependent upon receipt of full-time
salary. U.S.C.A, Const.Amend. 1.

[7| Constitutional Law 92 €=^>1947
92 Constitutional Law
92XVIH Freedom of Speech, Expression, and
Press
92XVHKP) Public Employees and Officials
92k 1947 k. Discharge, Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k90.1 (7.2)) ~
For government employee to support claim that her
dismissal violated her First Amendment rights, em*
ployee must show that speech involves matter of
public concern and not merely issue internal to
workplace, and that her interest in expression outweighs government's interest in promoting efficiency of public services it performs through its
employees: these are issues for district court,
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. I.
[8| Civil Rights 78 €==> 1430
78 Civil Rights
78III Federal Remedies in General
78k 1425 Questions of Law or Fact
78k 1430 k. Employment Practices, Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 78k244)
Constitutional Law 92 €=>1932

|6| Constitutional Law 92 €=^1928
92 Constitutional Law
92XVII1 Freedom of Speech, Expression, and

92 Constitutional Law
92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and
Press
92XVIII(P) Public Employees and Officials
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92k 1932 k. Causation; Substantial or Motivating Factor. Most Cited. Cases
(Formerly 92k90.1(7.2))
If government employee shows that her protected
speech was substantial or motivating factor in decision to deny her benefit, government then has
burden to show that it would have reached same decision, absent protected speech; these are questions
of fact for jury. U.8X.A, Const.Arnend. I.
|9| Federal Civil Procedure 170A C=>2497.1
170A Federal Civil Procedure
170AXVI! Judgment
170AXVIKC) Summarv Judgment
I70AXVH(C)2 ParticularwCases
170Ak2497 Employees and Employment Discrimination, Actions Involving
l70Ak2497.l k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Material fact questions regarding whether employee's interest in voicing criticism of proposed
changes in Department of Corrections policy regarding sex offenders outweighed Department's interest in enforcing its code of conduct precluded
summary judgment in employer's § 1983 claim
against Department alleging that her termination violated her First Amendment right to free speech.
U.S.C.A. Const.Arnend. I; 42 ^U.S.C.A. § 1983;
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56. 28 U.S.C.A.
I10| Constitutional Law 92 C=>1933
92 Constitutional Law
92XV1II Freedom of Speech, Expression, and
Press
92XVflI(P) Public Employees and Officials
92k 1933 k. Disruption or Interference.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k90.1(7.2))
Government does not have to wait for public employee's speech to actually disrupt core operations
before it takes action, and its reasonable predictions
of harm used to justify restriction of employee
speech are entitled to some deference, however,
government cannot rely on purely speculative alleg-

ations that certain statements caused or will cause
disruption to justify regulation of employee speech,
U.S.C.A. Const.Arnend. I.
1111 Civil Rights 78 €=>1376(2)
78 Civil Rights
78III Federal Remedies in General
78k 1372 Privilege or Immunity; Good Faith
and Probable Cause
78k 1376 Government Agencies and Officers
78k 1376(2) k. Good Faith and Reasonableness; Knowledge and Clarity of Law; Motive
and Intent, in General Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 78k214(2))
Qualified immunity protects government official
from personal liability and burden of having to go
to trial unless he violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which reasonable
person would have known.
|12| Civil Rights 78 C » 1376(10)
78 Civil Rights
78III Federal Remedies in General
78k 1372 Privilege or Immunity; Good Faith
and Probable Cause
78k 1376 Government Agencies and Officers
78kl376(10) k. Employment Practices.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 78k214(7))
State corrections officials were not entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 suit brought by employee who alleged she was fired for speaking out about
department policies regarding sex offenders, since
law was clearly established that public employees
may not be discharged in retaliation for speaking on
matters of public concern, absent showing that employer's interest in efficiency of its operations outweighed employee's interest in speech. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983.
*724 Nathan B. Wi!cox,Anderson & Karrenberg, (
Ross C, Anderson and Kate A. Toomey with him
on the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-
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Appellant.
Norman E. Plate. Assistant Utah Attorney General,
(Jan Graham, Utah Attorney General, with him on
the brief). Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before EBEL, KELLY and BRISCOE, Circuit
Judges.

PAUL KELLY. Jr., Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant Jessica Andersen appeals from
the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees on her civil rights claim under 42
U.S.C § 1983. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief
against O. Lane McCotter. in his official capacity
as Executive Director of the Utah Department of
Corrections (DOC), and monetary relief against
various corrections officials, in their individual capacities, claiming that she was fired from her position as an intern with the DOC in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment rights. Defendants
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). arguing that they were protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity. The
motion was supported by affidavits, and was therefore treated by the district court as a motion for
summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Applying the two-step qualified immunity analysis, the
district court found in the first instance that Defendants' actions did not violate Plaintiffs First
Amendment rights, and thus granted summary judgment. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1291 and reverse.

*725 Background
[I] In the summer of 1993, Ms. Andersen, then a
student at Weber State University, began an internship with the Utah Board of Pardons. She received
college credit, and was paid for twenty hours of
work per week. In September 1993. she was gran-

ted permission by the Board of Pardons to work at
the Bonneville Community Corrections Center
(BCCC), a facility managed"by the DOC. Ms. Andersen's work at BCCC was credited by the Board
of Pardons toward the wages it paid her. Until
March 1994, Ms. Andersen worked as an intern at
BCCC two nights per week, assisting in a therapy
program for sex-offenders.
Early in 1994 the DOC announced proposed
changes in the sex-offender treatment program. In
February 1994, Ms, Andersen was interviewed by a
Salt Lake City television station. During the interview, which was televised on the evening news, she
criticized the proposed changes, expressing her
concern that the changes could result in the premature release of potentially dangerous sex-offenders
into the community. Ms. Andersen confined her
comments to expressing her own opinion, and did
not disclose any confidential information. The next
day Ms. Andersen was informed that she was being
terminated because she had said "something negative about the Department," thus violating official
DOC policy. The policy prohibited DOC employees
from speaking to the media without prior authorization.
Ms. Andersen filed suit under § 1983, alleging that
her criticism of the proposed changes to the sexoffender treatment program constituted speech on a
matter of public concern, and was therefore protected by the First Amendment. She further alleged
that her exercise of her First Amendment rights was
the sole motivating factor in her dismissal. Defendants claimed qualified immunity, arguing that Ms,
Andersen's status as a "volunteer controlled the issue, and that the law was not clearly established
that volunteers were afforded the same First
Amendment protection as employees. In the first
part of the two-part qualified immunity analysis,
the district court concluded that Ms. Andersen's
constitutional rights were not violated, and therefore did not reach the second step in the qualified
immunity analysis. See Stegert v. Gillev, 500 U.S.
226, 232, III S.Ct. 1789/1793, 1.1.4 L.Ed.2d 277
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(1991): Hinton v. City of Ehvood. Kan.. 997 F.2d
774. 779-80 (10th Cir.1993). In making this determination, the district court applied the balancing
test set forth in Pickering v. Dour J of EJuc 391
U.S. 563. 568. 88 S.Ct. 1731. 1734-35. 20 L.Ed.2d
811 (1968). weighing Ms. Andersen's interest In
commenting upon matters of public concern against
the DOC's interest, as a government employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs.
On appeal. Ms. Andersen claims that her position
with the DOC was a valuable governmental benefit
which could only be denied in a manner that comports with the protections of the First Amendment
As such, she was entitled to the same protection under Pickering as any public employee. In addition*
she argues that the district court improperly granted
summary judgment because it performed the Pickering balancing test without sufficient evidence.
She also claims that the law was clearly established
in this area, thereby precluding Defendants' claims
of qualified immunity. We agree.

Discussion
[2] We review the district court's grant of summary
judgment de novo. Horn v. Squire, 81 F.3d 969, 973
(10th Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is appropriate
when there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When the First
Amendment is implicated, we are obligated to
'make an independent examination of the whole record" in order to ensure that ''the judgment does not
constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free
expression." Melton v. Citv of Oklahoma City, 879
F.2d 706. 713 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Base Corp.
v. Consumers Union of United States, 466 U.S. 485,
499. 104 S.Ct. 1949. 1958, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984)).

ment protections long recognized*726 for public
employees. Defendants argue that Ms. Andersen
was simply a volunteer, and as such cannot claim
she was deprived of a valuable governmental benefit or privilege because (1) she received no remuneration from the DOC for her services at BCCC,
(2) the college credit she received for her internship
was not necessary for the completion of her degree,
and (3) the DOC policy manual governing volunteers specifically provided that the position could
be terminated at any time for any reason by either
party. Essentially, Defendants argue that because
Ms. Andersen's position could be terminated 4iat
will," it cannot be viewed as a valuable governmental benefit. We are not persuaded. The uncontroverted facts indicate that Ms. Andersen was, for
all relevant purposes, a public employee.
[3] Whether Ms. Andersen was a public employee
or volunteer for purposes of applying the First
Amendment is a matter of state law. Cf. Jones w
University of Central Okia. 13 F.3d 361, 364-65
(10th Cir.1993) (whether an employee has a propem interest in employment for purposes of the
Fourteenth amendment requires reference to state
law). Under Utah law, " *an employee is hired and
paid a salary or wage, works under the direction of
the employer, and is subject to the employer's control." " Gourdin ex ret. Close r. Sharon's Cultural
Educ. Recreational Ass% 845 P.2d 242, 244 (Utah
1992) (quoting Board of Educ. of Alpine Sck DSL
v. O/sett 684>.2d 49,52 (Utah 1984)). The Utah
Volunteer Government Workers Act defines a
"Volunteer" as "any person who donates service
without pay or other compensation except expenses
actually and reasonably incurred as approved by the
supervising agency;* Utah Code Ann. § 67-20-2
(3)(a) (SuppJ995). Section Cgr06/01.03 of the
DOCs Adult Probation and Parole Manual defines
a "Volunteer" as "an individual who provides uncoerced and uncompensated services, including intern
services, for the Field Operations Division."
Aplt.App. at 45.

I. First Amendment Protection
Though an intern, Ms. Andersen did not provide
As an initial matter, we must determine whether
Ms. Andersen is entitled to the same First Amend-
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uncompensated services: she was paid for twenty
hours of work per week. The fact that she was paid
by the Board of Pardons instead of directly by the
DOC does not alter the source of the pa> ment-the
State of Utah. The hours Ms, Andersen worked at
BCCC were credited by the Board f Pardons toward the wages it paid her. She was. in effect.
loaned by the Board of Pardons to the DOC. Ms.
Andersen also received college credit for her work
at BCCC. Whether that particular credit was required for completion of her degree is a separate
matter from whether such credit has value. It is uncontroverted that the educational institution granted
credit for the experience, thereby conferring a nonmonetary benefit upon Ms. Andersen in exchange
for her continued participation in the State program.
Ms. Andersen worked under the direction of officials at BCCC, and was subject to their control. Under the terms of her unsigned agreement with the
DOC. Ms. Andersen was required to;
4. attend orientation, on-the-job, and in-service
training as directed;

6, follow instructions of paid staff members to
whom, [she was] responsible;

8. accept the responsibility of completing assignments and meeting the agreed upon work schedule; and
9. conduct [herself] with the dignity and assurance of a qualified member of a team performing
a needed service in a pleasant and efficient manner.
ApitApp. 52. Although the agreement was entitled
"Volunteer Agreement," we believe that the proper
focus must be on analyzing the uncontroverted facts
about the relationship against a backdrop of state
employment law, "cutting through the convenient
labeling of plaintiff as a "volunteer/ " Aplt.App.

142, Therefore, we conclude that under Utah law,
and by the terms of the DOCs own policies and
manuals.,. Ms, Andersen was not a volunteer-she
was obviously a government employee.
Finally, the fact that Ms. Andersen's employment
position was terminable at will does not diminish
her First Amendment claim.
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has
made clear that even though a person *727 has no
"right" to a valuable governmental benefit and
even though the government may deny him the
benefit for any number of reasons, there are some
reasons upon which the government may not rely.
It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis
that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of
speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of
those freedoms would in effect be penalized and
inhibited, This would allow the government to
produce a result which [it] could not command
directly. Such interference with constitutional
rights is impermissible.
Perry v. Sindermami 408 U.S. 593. 597. 92 S.Ct.
2694, 2697, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972) (citations and
quotations omitted); see also Rutan v. Republican
Party, 497 U.S. 62. 72, 110 S.Ct. 2729. 2736, 111
L.Ed.2d 52 (1990) (u[T]he assertion here that the
employee petitioners ... had no legal entitlement to
promotion, transfer, or recall [is] beside the
point."); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378,
383-84. 107 S.Ct. 2891, 2896-97, 97 L.Ed.2d 3\5
(1987) (holding that a probationary at-will employee is entitled to First Amendment protection): Seamons w Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir.1996):
A her cram hie v. OVv of Catoosa, Okhi, 896 F.2d
1228. 1233 (10th Cir. 19*90).
[4][5] When acting as a sovereign, the government
may not, in the absence of justification, restrict an
individual's right to speak freely on matters of public import; nor may the government indirectly exert
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leverage to suppress speech by unconstitutionally
tying the receipt of benefits to the speaker's coerced
silence. We hold that Ms. Andersen's termination
from her employment position as an intern with the
DOC because of her public comment on the DOC's
proposed changes in the sex-offender treatment
program implicated her First Amendment rights,
and invoked the protections afforded by the Pickering balancing test. However, even if we accepted
Defendants' arguments and considered Ms. Andersen a nonpaid volunteer, her claim would not be defeated. Defendants argue that volunteers are not entitled to First Amendment protection under Pickering. We disagree. The exercise of free speech rights
is not dependent upon the receipt of a full-time
salary. "[0]ur modem 'unconstitutional conditions'
doctrine holds that the government 'may not deny a
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected ... freedom of speech*...."
Board of Cowuv Comm'rs v. Umbelv\ 518 U.S.
668, — . 116 S.Ct. 2342. 2347. 135 LEd.2d 843
(1996) (quoting Pern. 408 U.S. at 597. 92 S.Ct. at
2697). For example, the Court has recognized a
variety of benefits which cannot be denied solely
because of the exercise of constitutional rights. See,
e.g., Rutan, 497 U.S. at 72-73, 110 S.Ct. at^2735-36
(promotion or transfer in a government job); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n. 6, 89 S.Ct.
1322, 1327 n. 6, 22 LEd.2d 600 (1969) (welfare
benefits); Sherbert v. Vemer. 374 U.S. 398, 404-05,
83 S.Ct. 1790. 1794-95, 10 LEd.2d 965 (1963)
(unemployment benefits); Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513. 525-26, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1341-41 2
L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958) (tax exemptions).
[6] Having concluded that a protectible interest exists, we must ascertain whether the court properly
balanced the interests of the institution against
those of the plaintiff. The district court merely took
the DOC's written policy and. in essence, concluded
that because it was in writing it was therefore justified. A government employer can deny the benefit
of employment to an employee who speaks out
against it on a matter of public concern only if it
can show that such speech adversely affects the ef-

ficiency or effectiveness of its operations, see Pickering, 391 U.S. at 56$. 88 S.Ct. at 1734-35. and
that the government's interest, as an employer, outweighs the individual employee's interest in the
particular speech, hi It is no different here. If Ms.
Andersen's speech on a matter of public concern
sufficiently disrupted the operations of the DOC,
the benefit of the opportunity to work at BCCC
may also be denied. Pickering and its progeny
make no distinctions based on the type of benefit
received by the individual. Thus, any benefits conferred by government employers may be limited or
denied on the basis of speech, *728 but only if that
speech adversely affects the government employer's
ability to carry out its operations and if the adverse
effect to the government outweighs the interests of
the speaker. The government employer must justify
the denial of benefits by showing that its interest in
maintaining efficient operations actually outweighs
the individual's interest in her speech on matters of
public concern, Since Ms. Andersen was deprived
of this benefit by a government employer, we must
apply the Pickering balancing test to determine
whether this termination violated her First Amendment rights.
[7] In order for Ms. Andersen to prevail on a claim
that her dismissal violated her First Amendment
rights, the court must first determine that her
speech is constitutionally protected. Horn, $\ F.3d
at 974: Moore v. City of Wvwmvood, 51 F.3d 924.
931 (10th Cir.1995). To establish that speech is
protected, the plaintiff must first show that the
speech involves a matter of public concern and not
merelv an issue internal to the workplace. Connick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138. 146-47. 103 S.Ct. 1684.
1689-90, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983); Moore. 57 FJd at
931. If the speech does involve a matter of public
concern, the plaintiff must then show that her interest in the expression outweighs the government's
interest in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees. Pickering 391 U.S. at 568, SS S.Ct. at 1734-35: Comidine v. Board of County Comm'rs, 910 F.2d 695, 700
(10th Cir. 1990). In this regard, the "[s]tate bears a
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burden of justifying the discharge on legitimate
arounds." Rankik 483 U.S. at 388, 107 S.Ct. at
2899: Connick. 461 U.S. at 150. 103 S.Ct. at
1691-92: Comidine, 910 F.2d at 700-01. These are
questions of law for the district court.
[8J If the balance in the Pickering test tips in favor
of the plaintiff-meaning the speech in question is
protected-the plaintiff must then show that the
speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the
decision to denv the benefit. ML Healthy City Sch.
DisL Bd ofEduc. v. Davie. 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97
S.Ct. 568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977); Horn 81
F.3d at 974. The government then has the burden to
show that it would have reached the same decision
in the absence of the protected speech. ML Healthw
429 U.S. at 287. 97 S.Ct. at 576: Horn, 81 F.3d at
974. These are questions of fact for the jury.
The parties agree and the district court found that
Ms. Andersen's statements criticizing the DOCs
proposed changes in its sex-offender treatment
policy did constitute speech on a matter of public
concern. At issue here is the district court's application of the Pickering balancing test.
[9] The district court granted summary' judgment to
Defendants because it found that Ms. Andersen's
interest in voicing her criticism was "clearly outweighed" by the DOCs interest in enforcing its
Code of Conduct. In so deciding, the court found
(I)
that
Ms. Andersen's criticisms
were
"unwarranted." (2) that the criticism "undermine[d]
public confidence'* in the DOC. and (3) that Ms.
Andersen's noncompliance with DOC policyspeaking to the public without prior authorization"Interfered with the regular operation of the DOC*
Such conclusions might be proper after balancing
the interests under Pickering, if they were supported by evidence. In this case, however, Defendants
put forth no evidence to support the district court's
findings. Instead, they rely solely on statements
contained in the DOCs Code of Conduct and its
Community Relations Manual, Section AE
02/03.01 (O) of the Code of Conduct provides that
"[njo member shall act or behave privately or offi-

cially in such a manner that undermines the efficiency of the Department, causes the public to lose
confidence in the Department, or brings discredit
upon himself, the State of Utah, or the Department." ApIt.App. at 33. Section AE 02/03.06 states
that "[m]embers shall not make critical or disloyal
public remarks about any policy, procedure, official
act, or other member of the Department...;*
ApIt.App. at 35. The Community Relations policy
expressly states that public criticism "undermines
public confidence in the DOC" and, therefore, is
forbidden. ApIt.App. at 37.
[10] Here, there is no integration of facts with the
policy statements. It is the governmental defendant's burden to justify the challenged discharge on
legitimate grounds. *729 Comidine, 910 F.2d at
700-01. The government does not have to wait for
speech to actually disrupt core operations before it
takes any action, and its reasonable predictions of
harm used to justify restriction of employee speech
are entitled to some deference. Moore, 57 F.3d at
934 (china Waters r. Churchill 511 U.S. 661. 673,
677, 114 S.Ct. 1878. 1837, 128 L.Ed.2d 686 (1994)
). However, **[t]he government cannot rely on
purely speculative allegations that certain statements caused or will cause disruption to justify the
regulation of employee speech." Moore, 57 F.3d at
934; IVuif v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 862
(10th Cir. 1989). The Pickering balancing test requires a "fact-sensitive" weighing of the government's interests. Umhehr, 518 U.S at —-, 116 S.Ct.
at 2348. Necessarily. Defendants must provide
evidence sufficient to assess the character and
weight of the DOCs interests. Comidine, 910 F.2d
at 701. Defendants provided no such evidence. Accordingly, at this stage of the proceedings. Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment.

II, Qualified Immunity
The district court found that Defendants* actions did
not violate Ms. Andersen's constitutional rights, and
therefore did not address whether, in the event of
such a violation, Defendants would be entitled to
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qualified immunity. We have concluded, however*
that the allegations at least implicate a clearly established right. Because both panics fully argued
the issue of qualified immunity before the district
court and on appeal, and because we find that the
proper resolution is apparent, we will consider this
lesal question. See Si.:gleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S.
106. 121. 96 S.Ct. 2868. 2877, 49 L.£d.2d 826
(1976); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d
1215. 122^) (10th Cir.1996); Medina v. Citv and
County of Denver. 960 F.2d 1493. 1497 (10th
Cir.1992).

Rankin. 483 U.S. at 388, 107 S.Ct. at 2899: Horn,
81 F.3d at 974; Moore, 57 F.3d at 931. Because the
law in this area was clearly established in March
1994, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
C.A. 10 (Utah), 1996.
Andersen v. McCotter
100F.3d723, 12 IER Cases 401
END OF DOCUMENT

[I1][I2] Qualified immunity protects a government
official from personal liability and the burden of
having to go to trial unless he violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v.
Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 800, EIS, 102 S.Ct. 2727,
2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Moore, 51 F.3d at
931. Defendants argue that even if Ms. Andersen's
termination violated her First Amendment rights,
they are entitled to qualified immunity because the
law was not clearly established in March 1994 that
a volunteer had the same rights as an employee or
that one's volunteer status could not be revoked on
the basis of protected speech. But see Hvland v.
Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129. 1136 (9th Cir.1992), cert,
denied 508 U.S. 908. 113 S.Ct. 2337, 124 L.Ed.2d
248 (1993); Janusaitis v. Middlehutr Volunteer
Fire Dep'L 607 F.2d 17, 25 (2d Cir.1979). We need
not decide whether it was clearly established before
this case that volunteers had Pickering protection,
because Ms. Andersen was not a volunteer. As discussed above, she was a public employee who was
paid by the State of Utah, who worked under the
direction of officials at BCCC and who was subject
to the control of the DOC. See Gourdin. 845 P.2d at
244. The law has been clearly established since
1968 that public employees may not be discharged
in retaliation for speaking on matters of public concern, absent a showing that the government employer's interest in the efficiency of its operations
outweighs the employee's interest in the speech.
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 56S, 88 S.Ct. at 1734-35;
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UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE

Title/Chapter/Section: J
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l0

1

Utah Code
Title 63G General Government
Chapter 7 Governmental Immunity Act of Utah
Section 401 Claim for injury - Notice -- Contents - Service - Legal disability — Appointment of
guardian ad litem.
63G-7-401. Claim for injury - Notice - Contents - Service - Legal disability - Appointment
of guardian ad litem.
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), a claim arises when the statute of limitations that
would apply if the claim were against a private person begins to run.
(b) The statute of limitations does not begin to run until a claimant knew, or with the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have known:
(i) that the claimant had a claim against the governmental entity or its employee: and
(ii) the identity of the governmental entity or the name of the employee.
(c) The burden to prove the exercise of reasonable diligence is upon the claimant.
(2) Any person having a claim against a governmental entity, or against its employee for an act or
omission occurring during the performance of the employees duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action,
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted;
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known; and
(iv) if the claim is being pursued against a governmental employee individually as provided in
Subsection 63G-7-202(3)(c), the name of the employee.
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian;
and
(ii) directed and delivered by hand or by mail according to the requirements of Section 68-3-8.5 to
the office of:
(A) the city or town clerk, when the claim is against an incorporated city or town;
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against a county;
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board, when the claim is against a school
district or board of education;
(D) the presiding officer or secretary/clerk of the board, when the claim is against a local district or
special service district;
(E) the attorney general when the claim is against the state:
(F) a member of the governing board, the executive director, or executive secretary, when the claim
is against any other public board, commission, or body; or
(G) the agent authorized by a governmental entity to receive the notice of claim by the governmental
entity under Subsection (5)(e).
(4) (a) If an injury that may reasonably be expected to result in a claim against a governmental entity
is sustained by a claimant who is under the age of majority or mentally incompetent, that governmental
entity may file a request with the court for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the potential
claimant.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(b) If a guardian ad litem is appointed, the timeforfilinga claim under Section 63G-7-402 begins
when the order appointing the guardian is issued.
(5) (a) Each governmental entity subject to suit under this chapter shall file a statement with the
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code within the Department of Commerce containing:
(i) the name and address of the governmental entity;
(ii) the office or agent designated to receive a notice of claim; and
(iii) the address at which it is to be directed and delivered.
(b) Each governmental entity shall update its statement as necessary to ensure that the information is
accurate;
(c) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall develop a form for governmental
entities to complete that provides the information required by Subsection (5)(a).
(d) (i) A newly incorporated municipality shall file the statement required by Subsection (5)(a)
promptly after the lieutenant governor issues a certificate of incorporation under Section 67-la-6.5.
(ii) A newly incorporated local district shall file the statement required by Subsection (5)(a) at the
time that the written notice isfiledwith the lieutenant governor under Section 17B-1-215,
(e) A governmental entity may, in its statement, identify an agent authorized by the entity to accept
notices of claim on its behalf
(6) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall:
(a) maintain an index of the statements required by this section arranged both alphabetically by entity
and by county of operation; and
(b) make the indices available to the public both electronically and via hard copy.
(7) A governmental entity may not challenge the validity of a notice of claim on the grounds that it
was not directed and delivered to the proper office or agent if the error is caused by the governmental
entity's failure to file or update the statement required by Subsection (5).
Amended by Chapter 350. 2009 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 63G07 040100.ZIP 4?096 Bytes
« Previous Section (63G-7-302)

Next Section (63G-7-402)»
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c

General

Court of Appeals of Utah.
CEDAR PROFESSIONAL PLAZA, L.C, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
CEDAR CITY CORPORATION, Defendant and
Appellee.
No. 20040958-CA.

30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30kS42(l) k. In General Most
Cited Cases

Feb. 9,2006.

241 Limitation of Actions
241V Pleading, Evidence, Trial and Review
241 k 199 Questions for Jury
24lkl99(l) k. In General Most Cited
The applicability of a statute of limitations and the
applicability of the discovery rule are questions of
law, which Court of Appeals reviews for correctness.

Background; Following the dismissal, due to failure to complv with pre-suit notice requirements of
Governmental Immunity Act. of property owner's
negligent supervision action against city, which
sought compensation for damage caused by an irrigation pipe that burst during construction project
at adjacent city-owned property, owner filed second
complaint that also included claims for direct negligence based on city's own activities. The Fifth District Court. Cedar City Department. J. Philip Eves.
J., awarded summary judgment to city. Owner appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, McHugh, J., held
that:
(1) trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over first complaint:
(2) owner was not required to set forth all specific
causes of action it might assert in the pre-suit notice
of claim: and
(3) equitable discovery rule did not toll one-year
period within which owner was required to file presuit notice of claim.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
111 Appeal and Error 30 €=>842(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent in

Limitation of Actions 241 € = > 199(1)

[2] Municipal Corporations 268 €=>845(1)
268 Municipal Corporations
268X11 Torts
268XII(D) Defects or Obstructions in Sewers, Drains, and Water Courses
268k845 Actions for Injuries
268k845(l) k. Nature of Remedy and
Notice or Presentation of Claim, Most Cited Cases
Trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
first complaint filed by property owner against city
arising out of damage caused by an irrigation pipe
that burst during construction project on adjacent
city-owned property, where pre-suit notices of
claim sent by owner pursuant to the Governmental
Immunity Act were not sent to city recorder, as required "by the Act. U.C.A.1953. 63-30-11
(3)(b)(ii)(A) (Repealed).
| 3 | Municipal Corporations 268 C=>845(1)
268 Municipal Corporations
268X11 Torts
268XI1(D) Defects or Obstructions in Sewers, Drains, and Water Courses
268k845 Actions for Injuries
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268k845(l) k. Nature of Remedy and
Notice or Presentation of Claim. Most Cited Cases
Property owner that sought to assert claim against
city for damage to its property caused by an irrigation pipe that burst during construction project on
adjacent city-owned property was not required to
set forth, in the pre-suit notice of claim required by
the Governmental Immunity Act all specific causes
of action it might assert against city, and thus notice of claim that alleged negligent supervision of
contractors was sufficient to provide notice of
claim for direct negligence by city based on its own
construction activity: notice was required only to
inform city of the nature of the claim, and additional theories of negligence could be added to the
complaint by way of amendment. U.C.A.1953,
63-30-11(3 )(a) (Repealed).
(4) Municipal Corporations 268 C==>741.15
268 Municipal Corporations
268X11 Torts
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and
Corporate Powers in General
268k74l Notice or Presentation of Claims
for Injury
268k741.I5 k. Necessity and Purpose.
Most Cited Cases
Purpose of the notice of a claim that is required to
be served on a governmental entity by the Governmental Immunity Act is to provide the governmental entity an opportunity to correct the condition that
caused the injury, evaluate the claim, and perhaps
settle the matter without the expense of litigation.
U.C.A.1953. 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(Repeaied).
\5\ Municipal Corporations 268 € ^ 7 4 1 . 5 0
268 Municipal Corporations
268X11 Torts
268XH(A) Exercise of Governmental and
Corporate Powers in General
268k741 Notice or Presentation of Claims
for Injury
268k741.50 k. Form and Sufficiency.
Most Cited Cases

The notice of claim required to be served on a governmental entity by the Governmental Immunity
Act need not meet the standards required to plead a
claim for relief, but must include only enough specificity in the notice to inform as to the nature of
the claim so that the defendant can appraise its potential
liability.
U.C.A.1953,'
63-30-11
(3)(a)(RepeaIed).
[6J Municipal Corporations 268 C=>741.40(1)
268 Municipal Corporations
268X11 Torts
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and
Corporate Powers in General
268k74! Notice or Presentation of Claims
for Injury
268k741.40 Excuses for and Relief
from Delay or Failure
268k741.40(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Attempts to avoid the rigors of the Governmental
Immunity Act's requirement of notice of claim by
tactical characterization of a claim are disfavored.
U.C.A.1953.63-30-11 (Repealed).
[7J Municipal Corporations 268 €>^845(1)
268 Municipal Corporations
268X11 Torts
268XII(D) Defects or Obstructions in Sewers, Drains, and Water Courses
268k845 Actions for Injuries
268k845( 1) k. Nature of Remedy and
Notice or Presentation of Claim, Most Cited Cases
Equitable discovery rule did not toll one-year period within which property owner was required, pursuant to Governmental Immunity Act. to file presuit notice of claim against city for damages caused
by irrigation pipe that burst during construction
project at adjacent city-owned property, and thus
such period began to run no later than date owner
attempted to file notice asserting a claim for negligent supervision of contractors, rather than date
owner learned city directly participated in construction: owner knew it had some form of negligence
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claim against city when it attempted to file notice,
and owner was not entitled to wait until it knew all
of the facts. U.C.AJ953. 63-30-13 (Repealed).
|8| Limitation of Actions 241 €^>43
241 Limitation of Actions
241II Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(A) Accrual of Right of Action or Defense
241 k43 k. Causes of Action in General
Most Cited Cases
Generally, a statute of limitations is triggered upon
the happening of the last evmt necessary to complete the cause of action.
|9| Limitation of Actions 241 € ^ 1 6 5
241 Limitation of Actions
241IV Operation and Effect of Bar by Limita- tion
24Ik 165 k. Operation as to Rights or Remedies in General. Most Cited Cases
If the plaintiff does not commence litigation within
the statutory time limit, the claim is barred.
1101 Limitation of Actions 241 €>=>95(1)
241 Limitation of Actions
241U Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(F) Ignorance. Mistake. Trust Fraud,
and Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action
24lk95 Ignorance of Cause of Action
241k95(l) k. In General: What Constitutes Discovery. Most Cited Cases
Mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action
will neither prevent the running of a statute of limitations nor excuse a plaintiffs failure to file a
claim within the relevant statutory period.

241k95(l) k. In General; What Constitutes Discovery. Most Cited Cases
In narrow instances, a statute of limitations may be
tolled pending the discovery of the facts forming
the basis of the claim.
f 12| Limitation of Actions 241 C » 9 5 ( l )
241 Limitation of Actions
241II Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust Fraud,
and Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action
24 Ik95 Ignorance of Cause of Action
241 k95( I) k. In Genera): What Constitutes Discovery. Most Cited Cases
Under the "equitable discovery rule/* the running
of a statute of limitations may be tolled: (1) where a
plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct, or (2) where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the
general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery- of the cause of action.
*277 Blaine T. Hofeling and Justin W. Wayment,
Hofeling & Wayment LLP, Cedar City, for Appellant.
Allan L. Larson and David F. Mull, Snow
Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

Before BENCH, P.J., DAVIS, and McHUGH, JJ.

OPINION

|111 Limitation of Actions 241 €^=>95(1)

McHUGH, Judge:

241 Limitation of Actions
24 III Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(F) Ignorance. Mistake, Trust, Fraud,
and Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action
241 k95 Ignorance of Cause of Action

f 1 Cedar Professional Plaza, L.C. (Cedar Professional) appeals the trial court's dismissal with prejudice of its complaint against Cedar City Corporation (Cedar City) for failure to comply with the notice provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act (the Act). See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -
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38 (1997 & Supp.2001).FM We affirm.
FN I. The Utah Legislature amended and
recodified the Act in 2004. See Utah Code
Ann. jfg 63-30d-l01 to -904 (2004). The
injuries alleged to be caused by Cedar City
occurred before those amendments and are
governed by the former version of the Act
See Houghton w Department of Health,
2005 UTC'63^ 3 n. 2, 125 P.3d 860. Therefore, all references in this decision are to
the former version of the Act.

BACKGROUND
% 2 On April 30. 2000, a buried irrigation pipe burst
on property (City Property) owned by Cedar Affordable Housing, an entity of Cedar City Housing
Authority, which was created by Cedar City. At the
time of the incident a low-income housing project
was under construction on the City Property. The
rupture caused flooding that infiltrated Cedar Professional's adjacent property, causing significant
damage*
1 3 On June 29. 2000, and September 28. 2000. Cedar Professional sent two separate letters (First Notice and Second Notice, respective!}) to Cedar City
officials in an attempt to comply with the notice
provisions of the Act. See id §§ 63-30-11, -13.
Thereafter, on January 8, 2001, Cedar Professional
filed a complaint against Cedar City and others
(First Complaint), claiming that Cedar City was liable for damages caused by the burst pipe due to its
negligent supervision of the construction on the
City Property.
f 4 Upon motion by Cedar City, the trial court dismissed the First Complaint on the grounds that the
First Notice and Second Notice had not been directed to the authorized governmental agent identified
in the Act See id § 63-30-11 (3)(b)(ii)(AX Cedar
Professional does not challenge the dismissal of the
First Complaint. Although over a year had passed
since the flooding, the trial court dismissed Cedar

Professional's complaint without prejudice.
*278 f 5 On October 25? 2002, Cedar Professional
prepared a new notice of claim (Third Notice) and
delivered it to the proper governmental agent See
id. Subsequently, on January 10, 2003, Cedar Professional filed a new complaint against Cedar City
(Second Complaint) that included claims for negligent supervision, as well as claims for direct negligence caused by Cedar City's own activities at the
construction site on the City Property. Cedar City
moved for summary judgment, arguing that the notice of claim had not been filed within one year as
required by the Act See id. § 63-30-13, The trial
court agreed and dismissed the Second Complaint
with prejudice. Cedar Professional appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
fl] *[ 6 The issue before this court is the application
of the discovery rule to the one-year notice requirement in the Act. See id. kThe applicability of a statute of limitations and the applicability of the discovery rule are questions of law, which we review
for correctness." Russell Packard Dew, inc. w Carson 2005 UT I4,«j 18, 108 P.3d 741 (quotations
and citation omitted).

ANALYSIS
[2] f 7 Cedar City is a municipal corporation that
can be sued only in accordance with the provisions
of the Act. When a claim is against an incorporated
city, the Act requires a plaintiff to deliver a notice
of claim to the city recorder "within one year after
the claim arises," Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13; see
id. § 63-30-] l(3)(b)(ii)(A). There is no dispute that
the First Notice and Second Notice were not delivered to the Cedar City recorder. Thus, the trial
court properly dismissed the First Complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See. e.g.,
Houghton w Department of Health, 2005 UT 63,f
20, 125 P.3d 860 (providing that strict compliance
with the notice requirements of the Act is necessary
to confer subject matter jurisdiction): Gurule v. Salt
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Lake Countw 2003 UT 25.*! 5. 69 P.3d 1287
(same): Wheeler v. McPherson. 2002 UT \6^ 11.
40 P.3d 632 (same): Greene v. Utah Transit Audi.
2001 UT 109.*;*; 15-16. 37 P.3d 1156 (same).
[3] r 8 On October 25, 2002. after the First Complaint was dismissed. Cedar Professional prepared
the Third Notice, which it delivered to the Cedar
City recorder. Although it was delivered to the correct governmental agent, see Utah Code Ann. §
63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(A). the Third Notice was sent
well over one year after the April 30, 2000 incident
that caused the flooding. Cedar Professional argues
that the Third Notice was timely because it was delivered within one >ear of the time Cedar Professional learned that Cedar City had operated construction equipment on the City Property and was
allegedly negligent for its own activities, as opposed to being negligent in its supervision of other
parties. We disagree.
K P ] II 9 Nothing in the Act requires a claimant to
set forth in the notice of claim each specific cause
of action that might be pleaded against the government enth\\ Rather, the Act requires only that the
notice of claim include "a brief statement of the
facts/* "the nature of the claim asserted." and "the
damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are
known." Id § 63-30-1 i(3)(aXi)-(iii). "The purpose
of the notice is to providef ] the governmental entity an opportunity to correct the condition that
caused the injury, evaluate the claim, and perhaps
settle the matter without the expense of litigation/"
Houghton. 2005 UT 63 at r 20. 125 P.3d 860
(alteration in original) (quotations and citations
omitted). The notice need not meet the standards required to plead a claim for relief, but must include
only "enough specificity in the notice to inform as
to the nature of the claim so that the defendant can
appraise its potential liability.'" Id at <[ 21
(quotations and citation omitted).
[6] f 10 Thus,
were sufficient
of the claim so
ability. See id.

the First Notice and Second Notice
to inform Cedar City of the nature
that it could appraise its potential liThe First Complaint named Cedar

City as a defendant and asserted negligence claims
against it. Had Cedar Professional directed the First
Notice or Second Notice to the correct governmental agent, see Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11
(3)(b)(ii)(A), its First Complaint would not have
been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Upon learning*279 of Cedar City's direct involvement in the construction activities on the City
Property. Cedar Professional would then have been
entitled to amend the First Complaint to add additional negligence theories, even if the statute of
limitations had run. Fs: It is only because the First
Notice and Second Notice were ineffective that Cedar Professional attempted to repackage its claims
arising out of the April 30, 2000 incident as a new
cause of action. Attempts to avoid the rigors of the
Act by tactical characterization of a claim are disfavored. See Gil(man v. Department of Fin, Insts..
782 P.2d 506. 512 (Utah 1989) (rejecting bankruptcy trustee's attempt to cast a claim arising out
of a regulator's licensing decision as a negligence
action to avoid the Act): see also Jensen v. IHC
Hasps.. Inc.. 944 P.2d 327. 336-37 (Utah 1997)
(rejecting attempt to avoid medical malpractice
statute of limitations by characterizing claim as
fraud).
FN2. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)
provides that new claims added in an
amended complaint relate back to the date
of the original complaint if "the claim ...
asserted in the amended [complaint] arose
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth
in the original [complaint]." Utah R. Civ.
P. 15(c): see also Gary Porter Consir. v.
Far Constr.. Inc., 2004 UT App 354,«; 40,
101 P3d 371 (discussing test for relation
back under rule 15(c)). cert, denied, 123
P.3d 815 (Utah 2005).
[ 7 P P ] [ 1 0 ] 1 II Furthermore. Cedar Professional
cannot rely on the discovery rule to avoid the effects of the running of the statutory time in which it
could file a valid notice of claim. The Act provides
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that a claim against a governmental entity is barred
unless a notice of claim is filed "within one year
after the claim arises.** Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13:
see also Warren \\ Provo Cin* Corp., 838 PJd
1125. 1128 (Utah 1092) ("The notice of claim provisions of sections 63-30-11 and 63-30-13 operate
as a one-year statute of limitations In cases brought
against a governmental entity;*). "A claim arises
when the statute of limitations that would apply if
the claim were against a private person begins to
run/* Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(1). General!}', a
statute of limitations is triggered "upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the
cause of action/' Russell Packard Dew. Inc. v. Carson. 2005 UT I4, r 20. 108 P.3d 741 (quotations
and citation omitted). If the plaintiff does not commence litigation within the statutory time limit, the
claim is barred. See id Furthermore. "[m]ere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action will
neither prevent the running of [a] statute of limitations nor excuse a plaintiffs failure to file a claim
within the relevant statutory period.*" Id.
[11 If 122] If 12 In narrow instances, a statute of limitations may be tolled pending the discovery of the
facts forming the basis of the claim. See id at *[ 21.
The Act does not contain an internal statutory' discovery rule. Thus, there are two situations in which
the running of the one-year notice requirement in
the Act may be tolled under the "equitable discovery rule'*:
(I) where a plaintiff does not become aware of
the cause of action because of the defendant's
concealment or misleading conduct, and (2)
where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule
would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any
showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action.
M at f 25 (quotations and citations omitted). Cedar
Professional concedes that, absent application of
the equitable discovery rule, the Third Notice is untimely. It argues, however, that the one-year notice
requirement in the Act, see Utah Code Ann. §

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No

60-30-13, did not commence until It discovered Cedar City's direct participation in the construction
activities on the City' Property that allegedly caused
the flooding.
| 13 There is nothing exceptional about the circumstances of this case that would satisfy the second
situation for application of the equitable discovery
rule, see Carson, 2005 UT 14 at «f 25. 108 P.3d 74 L
and Cedar Professional does not assert its application here. Thus, the Third Notice is timely only if
Cedar Professional did not become aware of the
cause of action because of the City's concealment
or misleading conduct. See id. From the allegations
contained in the First Complaint and the First Notice and Second Notice, it is undisputed that Cedar
Professional-280 was aware of a negligence claim
against Cedar City as early as June 29, 2000. Nevertheless. Cedar Professional asserts that the oneyear notice period in the Act. see Utah Code Ann. §
63-30-13. did not commence until it discovered
facts to support a direct negligence claim against
Cedar City. We disagree.
f 14 Cedar Professional was not entitled to wait until it knew all of the facts supporting its negligence
claim against Cedar City. It is enough that Cedar
Professional was "aware that the governmental entity's action or inaction ha[d] resulted in some kind
of harm to its interests.*' Bank One Utah KA, v.
West,Jordan City, 2002 UT App 2714 12, 54 P J d
135. Further, this is not a case where the claimant
was unaware that the governmental entity had
harmed its interest. See Vincent v. Salt Lake
County. 583 P.2d 105, 107 (Utah 1978) (holding
that the one-year limit under the Act was tolled until the plaintiff learned, despite the defendant's contrary representations, that the defendant's storm
drain was the cause of damage). Whether Cedar
City had hoped to conceal its potential liability,
which we do not decide. Cedar Professional knew
enough to assert that Cedar City's negligence had
resulted in "some kind of harm to its interests** as of
the date of the First Notice. Bank One Utah 2002
UT App 271 at If 12, 54 P.3d 135. The feet that sub-
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sequently learned information allowed Cedar Professional to refine its negligence claim did not toll
the one-year period during which it was required to
serve notice upon Cedar City pursuant to the Act.
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13; Peterson v. Union
Puc. R.R. Co.. 79 Utah 213, 8 P.2d 627. 630-31
(1932) (holding that plaintiffs amended complaint
was not barred by the applicable statute of limitations where the amendment merely expanded on
plaintiffs negligence theories, and stating that "in a
tort action an amendment may vary the statement of
the original complaint as to the manner in which the
plaintiff was injured or as to the manner of the defendant's breach of duty").

CONCLUSION
f 15 The trial court properly concluded that the discovery rule was inapplicable in this case and that
Cedar Professional's action was barred by the oneyear notice requirement in the Act See Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-13. Therefore, we affirm the trial
court's dismissal with prejudice of Cedar Professional's complaint.
1 16 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH,
Presiding Judge and JAMES 2. DAVIS, Judge.
Utah App.,2006.
Cedar Professional Plaza. L.C. v. Cedar Citv Corp.
131 P.3d 275. 535 Utah Adv. Rep. 5. 2006 UT App
36
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c
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Kent A. HEIDEMAN; Kimball B. Gardner: and
Birdview Manufacturing Inc., a Utah corporation.
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
WASHINGTON CITY, a Utah municipal corporation; and unknown persons working for or under the
authority of Washington City, Defendants and Appellees.
NO.20050941-CA.

claim;
(6) city employees' acceptance of prepayment of
water impact fees did not create a contract that obligated city to honor those fees in the future;
(7) any contract formed by prepayment of water impact fees was void as against public policy.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[!J Municipal Corporations 268 C=»741.35

Jan. 11,2007.
Background: Developers who had paid water impact fees to city prior to fee increase for prospective
units sued city for breach of contract, breach of
duty of good faith and fair dealing, violation of
civil rights under § 1983. taking without just compensation, due process violations, intentional interference with prospective economic relations, and
attorney fees, all regarding the city's refusal to honor fee payments. On competing motions for summary judgment, the Fifth District Court. St. George
Department, G. Rand Beacham, J., entered judgment for city. Developers appealed.

268 Municipal Corporations
268X11 Torts
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and
Corporate Powers in General
268R74I Notice or Presentation of Claims
for Injury
268k741.35 k. Effect of delay or failure to give. Most Cited Cases
Failure to strictly comply with the notice of claim
requirements under the Governmental Immunity
Act results in a court's lack of jurisdiction.
U.C.A.1953, 63-30-11 (Repealed).
[21 Municipal Corporations 268 €^>74L50

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Greenwood. Associate P. J., held that:
(1) developers' notice of claim was insufficient to
support intentional interference with prospective
economic relations claim;
(2) developers failed to put alleged disputed facts at
summary judgment at issue with admissible evidence of such facts;
(3) water impact fees were not ''permits" to which
developers could have a legitimate claim of entitlement;
(4) developers foiled to meet city eligibility requirements to honor prepaid water impact fees;
(5) even if fee were a permit, developers had no
protected property interest in issuance of water impact fee permit required for due process violation

268 Municipal Corporations
268X11 Torts
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and
Corporate Powers in General
268k741 Notice or Presentation of Claims
for Injury
268k741.50 k. Form and sufficiency.
Most Cited Cases
Developers' notice of claim against city alleging
breach of contract, § 1983 claims, and "other
causes of action," was insufficient to put city on notice of intentional interference with economic relations claim developers brought against city in lawsuit. U.C.A.I953, 63-30-1I(3)(a) (Repealed).
(3J Judgment 228 €=>!85,2(9)
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22S Judgment
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228k 182 Motion or Other Application
228k 185.2 Use of Affida\its
228k 185.2(9) k. Effect of failure to file
affidavit. Most Cited Cases
Judgment 228 C = ? 185.3(1)
228 Judgment
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228k 182 Motion or Other Application
228k185.3 Evidence and Affidavits in
Particular Cases
228k 185.3(1) k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
Developers who brought various claims against city
after city refused to honor water impact fees paid
by developers in anticipation of fee increase for future units, failed to put alleged disputed facts at issue in response to city's summary judgment motion,
given that developers failed to support memorandum alleging disputed facts with any admissible
evidence of the alleged disputed facts. Rules
Civ.Proc. Rule 7(c)(3)(B).
|4] Constitutional Law 92 C=>3874(1)
92 Constitutional Law
92XXV1I Due Process
92XXVII(B) Protections Provided and
Deprivations Prohibited in General
92k3868 Rights, Interests, Benefits, or
Privileges Involved in General
92k3874 Property Rights and Interests
92k3S74(l) k. In general Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k277(1))
To prevail on a due process claim that the party was
deprived of certain property by the city, the party
must first establish that it has a "protective property interest/" which is a legitimate claim of entitlement. U.S.C.A, Const.Amend. 14.

92 Constitutional Law
92XXVII Due Process
92XXVH(G) Particular Issues and Applications
92XXVH(G)3 Property in General
92k4091 Zoning anu Land Use
92k40L33 k. Particular issues and
applications. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly i'2k278.2(1))
Zoning and Planning 414 ©=>1382(4)
414 Zoning and Planning
414 VI11 Permits. Certificates, and Approvals
414VI1KA) In General
414k 1379 Maps, Plats, and Plans: Subdivisions
414k 1382 Conditions and Agreements
414k 13 82(4) k. Fees, bonds and in
lieu payments. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 414k382.4)
Developers did not have legitimate claim of entitlement to water impact fee "permits" at reduced rates
before city's rate increase, as required to show that
city's failure to honor payment of such fees violated
developer's due process rights, given that water impact fee was not "permit." but was merely prerequisite to obtaining a building permit, and fee
was a charge by city to regulate new growth and
development and to provide adequate public facilities and services. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; West's
U.C.A.§ 11-36-102(7Xa).
[6| Constitutional Law 92 €^>4093
92 Constitutional Law
92XXV1I Due Process
92XXV1I(G) Particular Issues and Applications
92XXVII(G)3 Propertv in General
92k409j Zoning arid Land Use
92k4093 k. Particular issues and
applications. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k278.2(I))

|5j Constitutional Law 92 €=>4093
Zoning and Planning 414 0=^1382(4)
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414 Zoning and Planning
414VIII Permits. Certificates, and Approvals
414VHI(A In General
414k 1379 Maps. Plats, and Plans; Subdivisions
414k 1382 Conditions and Agreements
4l4kl382(4) k. Fees, bonds and in
lieu pavments. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 414k382.4)
City did not violate developers' due process rights
by refusing to honor prepayment of water impact
fees at reduced rate before fee increase, given that
city established eligibility for payment under prior
rate of submitting permit applications within two
weeks after effective date of fee increase, and developers failed to submit permit applications within
the time provided. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
)7j Constitutional Law 92 €=^4093
92 Constitutional Law
92XXVII Due Process
92XXV1I(G) Particular Issues and Applications
92XXVII(G)3 Propertv in General
92k409l Zoning and Land Use
92k4093 k. Particular issues and
applications. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k278.2(l))
Zoning and Planning 414 € ^ 1 3 8 2 ( 4 )
414 Zoning and Planning
414VIII Permits. Certificates, and Approvals
414VIII(A) In General
414k 1379 Maps, Plats, and Plans: Subdivisions
414k 1382 Conditions and Agreements
414k 1382(4) k. Fees, bonds and in
lieu payments. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 414k382.4)
Even if city's water impact fee were a permit, developers did not have legitimate claim of entitlement to receive such permit as required to demonstrate a protected property interest for claim that
city violated their due process rights by refusing to

honor their prepayment of water impact fees prior
to fee increase, given that there were no established
rules or guidelines to secure developers a certain
benefit when they tendered payment for the fees to
the city. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend, 14; West's U.C.A.
§ 11-36-101.
|8| Contracts 95 C=>9(1)
95 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
951(A) Nature and Essentials in General
95k9 Certainty as to Subject-Matter
95k9{ 1) k. In general. Most Cited Cases
Contracts 95 € ^ > 1 5
95 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
951(B) Parties. Proposals, and Acceptance
95k 15 k. Necessity of assent. Most Cited
Cases
Contracts 95 C=>27
95 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
951(B) Parties, Proposals, and Acceptance
95k27 k. Implied agreements. Most Cited
Cases
An express or implied-in-fact contract results when
there is a manifestation of mutual assent by words
or actions or both, which reasonably are interpretable as indicating an intention to make a bargain with certain terms or terms which reasonably
may be made certain.
|9J Zoning and Planning 414 € = > 1382(4)
414 Zoning and Planning
414VIII Permits, Certificates, and Approvals
414VIII(A) In General
414k 1379 Maps, Plats, and Plans; Subdivisions
414k 1382 Conditions and Agreements
414k 1382(4) k. Fees, bonds and in
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lieu pavments. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 414k382.4)
City employees' acceptance of developers' tender of
prepayment for water impact fees at prior rate before increase for prospective units did not create a
contract that obligated city to honor the pavments
for a development at some time in the future, given
that there was no offer to enter into a contract, there
was no acceptance from any qualified to enter into
contracts for the city, no communication that indicated any type of meeting of the minds, and city did
not vote on contract or have one signed by city recorder. West's U.C.A. §§ 10-3-506. 10-6-138.
(10] Zoning and Planning 414 € ^ 1 3 8 2 ( 4 )
414 Zoning and Planning
4I4V1II Permits, Certificates, and Approvals
4I4V11I(A) In General
414k 1379 Maps, Plats, and Plans: Subdivisions
414k 1382 Conditions and Agreements
4l4k!382(4) k. Fees, bonds and in
lieu pavments. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 414k382.4)
Any contract that could have been formed by acceptance by city employees of developers' prepayment of water impact fees for future development
in anticipation of fee increase was void as against
public policy: city's ability to protect health, safety,
and welfare of the public would be seriously
hampered if mere acceptance of fee created binding
obligation on city.
*9Q2 Justin R, Elswick and Justin D. Heideman,
Ascione Heideman & McKay. LLC, Provo, for Appellants.
Jeffrey N. Starkey and Bryan J. Pattison, Durham
Jones & Pinegar, St. George, for Appellees.
Before GREENWOOD, Associate P.I, BILLINGS
and ORME, JJ.

GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge:
f 1 Kent A. Heideman, Kimball B. Gardner, and
Birdview
Manufacturing,
Ine.(coIIectively,
Plaintiffs) FNI appeal the trial court's grant of summaty judgment in favor of Defendant Washington
City (the City), claiming the trial court erred in
concluding that (I) Plaintiffs' notice of claim was
defective because it failed to name all possible
causes of action, (2) there were no genuine issues
of material fact, (3) Plaintiffs did not have a protected property interest at stake, (4) the City had not
converted Plaintiffs' property, (5) the City's conduct
did not amount to an unconstitutional taking, (6)
the parties had not entered into a contractual relationship, (7) the City had not breached any contracts with Plaintiffs, and (8) the City had not
breached the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. We affirm.
FNI. Plaintiff Birdview Manufacturing,
Inc. was not named as a claimant in
Plaintiffs' notice of claim, see Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-11(2) (Supp.2003), repealed
by id § 63-3M-401 (2004), and was therefore barred from pursuing any claim for intentional interference with economic relations asainst the City. See Pigs Gun Club,
Inc. v. ~Sanpete Coimty> 2002 UT 17, f 10,
42 P.3d 379 ("Each plaintiffs name must
be on the notice of claim.").

BACKGROUND
f 2 On October 23, 2002, the City passed Ordinance Number 2002-13 (the Ordinance), see Washington City, Utah, Ordinance 2002-13 (Oct 23,
3002), which increased water impact fees from
S2284 to S3182 per dwelling unit.1*2 During the
October 23 hearing at which the Ordinance was
first discussed. Plaintiff Kent Heideman, a city
council member and land developer, expressed concern about when the Ordinance would go into effect. Mr. Heideman argued that the city council
should give developers, including himself,, "thirty

OPINION
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days to get [current projects] wrapped up." Council
member Roger Bundy stated that the City of St.
George "had a stampede" when it did as Mr.
Heideman suggested. When it came time to vote on
the *903 Ordinance, Mr. Bundy stated that "there
may be some people that have permits sitting there
ready to be pulled,*4 and he thought a two-week
waiting period was necessary/^ The council ultimately voted to approve the Ordinance with a
November 6, 2002 effective date.
FN2. Impact fees are sums of money
"imposed upon development activity as a
condition of development approval." Utah
Code Ann. § 1 l-36-102(7)(a) (Supp.2006).
Municipalities are authorized to charge
them under Utah's Impact Fees Act. See id.
§§ 11-36-101 to -501 (2003 & Supp.2006).
FN3. The term "pulled" is used to refer to
a building permit that is ready to be issued.
% 3 On November 6, 2002, Mr. Heideman tendered
two checks to the City for a total of Si50,744 and
requested sixty-six "water impact fee permits" FX4
at the prior rate of S2284. On the same day.
Plaintiff Kimball Gardner, on behalf of Birdview
Manufacturing, Inc., provided the City with a
$34,230 check and $30 In cash for fifteen water impact fee permits at the $2284 rate. The City's front
office staff accepted the payments from Mr.
Heideman and Mr. Gardner and issued receipts indicating thai the payments were for "66 water impact fees" and "15 water impact fees" respectively.
Both checks were negotiated and deposited into the
City's financial account. Prior to accepting
Plaintiffs' payments, the City's front office staff had
not received any instruction regarding the impact
fee rate increase,
FN4, Although Plaintiffs repeatedly refer
to "permits" throughout their brief, there
are no permits at issue in this case. An impact fee is a condition precedent to a building permit, see Utah Code Ann. §
ll-36-102(7)(a); it is not a 4itax, a special

assessment a building permit fee, ... or
other reasonable permit or application
fee.n&e/d§
U-35-102(7)(b).
| 4 At the next city council meeting, on November
13, 2002, the council addressed the fact that there
was some confusion regarding prepayment of impact fees. Specifically, the council discussed the
fact that builders usually pay impact fees when
their building permits are ready for approval, but in
response to the fee increase, some were paying impact fees early. The city attorney stated that "[t]here
needs to be clarification to exceptions to early payment of impact fees put on the agenda for the
Council to approve." The mayor then stated that the
city manager would contact those who had prepaid
and let them know the issue would be on the next
city council meeting's agenda for purposes of clarification. The next hearing to discuss the impact fees
was set for December 11, 2002, and public notice
was promptly posted,
f 5 At the December 11 hearing, the agenda item,
"Clarification of the pre-purchasing of fees concerning the increase of the Water Impact Fee that
was effective November 6, 2002," was addressed
The council discussed the following issues: the
City's intent to tie impact fees to specific lots,
whether the two-week time frame was meant to accommodate building permits that were being pulled
during the two-week period, and how the City
would proceed with prepaid impact fees from those
who were not at the meeting.
f 6 During the meeting, the city council expressed
concern that if it accepted all of the prepayments, it
would simply need to raise the fees again to accommodate more growth. The council then allowed
audience members to comment, at which time Mr.
Gardner argued that the City should honor his prepayments and "stick by [the] contract that [it] made
when [it] cashed the check." The city attorney responded that **[b]re[a]ch of contract is not an issue
because the staff does not have authority to enter
into a contract." Mr. Heideman requested an executive session to address his payments to the City;
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however, his request was not granted. He made no
additional statements. At the close of the discussion, the mayor announced that "those people who
have prepaid the impact fees and have not pulled
their permits have two weeks until December 26 [ ]
to pull their permits, if they don't meet ... the City's
criteria then the City will refund their money;'
Neither Mr. Heideman nor Mr, Gardner submitted
building permits to the City by the December 26,
2002 deadline.
% 7 On January 27. 2003, the City mailed a certified
letter to Mr. Heideman stating that he was not entitled to prepay water impact fees because he failed
to present the City with a building permit prior to
the December 26 deadline. The City enclosed a
check, dated January 2. 2003. for SI50.744. Mr.
Heideman returned the check on January 30, 2003.
A similar letter was mailed to Mr. Gardner.
However, after three failed delivery*904 attempts,
it was returned to sender, Mr, Heideman claims he
eventually accepted payment after the City stipulated, at a temporary restraining order (TRO) hearing, that he could preserve his claims for litigation
despite receiving the refund. However, there is no
evidence of the stipulation agreement or the TRO
hearing in the record on appeal. There is also no
evidence regarding when Mr, Heideman actually
cashed the City's check.rv'
FN5. On appeal. Plaintiffs request interest
for the "almost 6 month period" in which
the City "wrongfully retained** their funds.
Plaintiffs specifically request such relief
for the first time in this appeal. All of their
pleadings in the trial court sought delivery
of the "permits." Moreover, Plaintiffs fail
to provide any evidence documenting for
how long the City held their funds. Therefore, we will not address their claim for interest on the funds. See State v. Invin, 924
P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct.App.1996) ("It is a
well-established rule that a defendant who
fails to bring an issue before the trial court
is generally barred from raising it for the

first time on appeal.").
r

8 On or about February 4, 2003, Mr. Heideman
filed a notice of claim with the City.FNb See Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (Supp.2003). In the nature of
claims section. Mr. Heideman listed the following
claims: breach of contract. " § 1983 claims against
certain city officials/' and "[o]ther causes of action." On or about April 2, 2003. Mr. Heideman
filed another notice of claim adding Mr. Gardner as
a claimant. Other than the additional claimant, the
two notices were identical.
FN6. After Plaintiffs filed their notice of
claim, the Utah Legislature repealed the
Governmental Immunity Act, see Utah
Code Ann. §§ 63-30-0*1 to -38 (1997 &
Supp.2003) (repealed), and replaced it with
the Governmental Immunitv Act of Utah,
see id §§ 63-30d-I01 to -904 (2004). Because Plaintiffs' notice of claim was filed
when the Governmental Immunity Act was
effective, we refer to that version of the legislation. See Cook v. City of Moroni 2005
UT App 4 0 4 In. I. 107P.3d713.
*i 9 On March 12, 2003. Plaintiffs filed a complaint
against the City alleging breach of contract and
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
About six months later. Plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint alleging, in addition to the two previous
claims, governmental taking without just compensation, conversion, violation of due process, and violation of appellants' civil rights under chapter 42.
section 1983 of the United States Code. Eight
months later. Plaintiffs filed yet another amended
complaint, this time adding claims for attorney fees
under section 1988 of the United States code and
"the private attorney general doctrine." and a claim
for intentional interference with prospective economic relations.
f 10 After filing the second amended complaint
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The City
opposed, and filed its own cross-motion for summary judgment and motion to strike the substantive
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paragraphs of Mr. Heideman's's affidavit submitted
in support of Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, FN~ On October 22. 2004, the trial court
granted the City's motion for summary judgment
and denied Plaintiffs'. Plaintiffs filed a motion to
reconsider, which the court denied. They now appeal.
FN7. Plaintiffs1 motion was supported with
citations to the record and Mr. Heideman's
own sworn affidavit, The trial court struck
the affidavit as improper. Plaintiffs do not
appeal that ruling, yet refer to the affidavit
in their brief. This court will not consider
the stricken affidavit.

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
<| 11 Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in granting
the City's cross-motion for summary judgment
based on its conclusions that (1) Plaintiffs' notice of
claim was defective because it failed to name all
possible causes of action, (2) there were no genuine
issues of material fact, (3) Plaintiffs did not have a
protected property interest at stake, (4) the City had
not converted Plaintiffs1 property, (5) the City's
conduct did not amount to an unconstitutional taking. (6) the parties had not entered into a contractual relationship. (7) the City had not breached any
contracts with Plaintiffs, and (8) the City had not
breached the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. Summary judgment is only appropriate
when there are no genuine issues of material fact
and the parties are entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Consequently, we
review the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness. See *9Q5Jones r. Salt Lake City Corp.,
2003 UT App 355, €\ 7. 78 PJd 988. In doing so,
"we view the [undisputed] facts in a light most favorable to the party against which the motion was
granted.** Anderson \\ Provo Citv Corp., 2005 UT
5, <[ 10, 108 PJd 701 (alteration in original)
(quotations and citations omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. Plaintiffs' Notice of Claim

[1] f 12 The trial court held that Plaintiffs' intentional interference claim was jurisdictional^ barred
because, among other reasons, the notice of claim
was defective. The Governmental Immunity Act
(the Act) requires individuals with claims against
government entities to comply with the notice of
claim requirements sti forth in Utah Code section
63-30-11. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1997 &
Supp.2003). Failure to strictly comply with these
requirements results in a lack of jurisdiction. See
Gunile v. Salt lake Coumw 2003 UT 25, % 5, 69
P.3d 1287; Greene v. Utah Transit Autk, 2001 UT
109.fi[l5-l6,37P.3dll56. FN *
FN8. Because the notice of claim provision
is the same in both versions of the Act, see
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-01 to -38 (1997
and Supp.2003); id §§ 63-30d-101 to -904
(2004), case law addressing the notice of
claim requirement under either version
governs. See Johnson v. Utah Dep't of
Tramp., 2006 UT 15, «| 12 n. 6, 133 PJd 402.
[2] | 13 The Act specifically requires the notice of
claim to include ki(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and (iii) the
damages incurred by the claimant so far as thev are
known." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(ai In
Plaintiffs' notice of claim, they listed three potential
claims against the City; "Breach of Contract[,] §
1983 claims against certain city officialsf,] ... and
[ojther causes of action." Plaintiffs now argue that
this was sufficient to put the City on notice of an
intentional interference with economic relations
claim. They assert that the document, when viewed
as a whole, "provided Appellees sufficient opportunity to investigate, discuss and resolve the potential claim before the parties became locked in a
lawsuit." This argument, however, is unpersuasive.
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*f 14 The requirement of strict compliance derives
from the fact that the ability to sue the government
is "a statutorily created exception to the Doctrine of
Sovereign Immunity, Inasmuch as the maintenance
of such a cause of action derives from such statutory authority, a prerequisite thereto is meeting the
conditions prescribed in the statute.** Galfegos v.
MUh\ile City. 27 Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335,
1336-37 (1972). Although Plaintiffs cite to cases
liberally applying the strict compliance requirement, those cases predate the Act's 1998 amendment. "As [the supreme court] stated in Gurule [v.
Salt Lake Counn: 2003 UT 25, 69 P.3d 1287]. we
have allowed for less than strict compliance [only]
in cases which depended upon ambiguities in the ...
Act: ambiguities clarified by the 1998 amendments/ " Davis v. Central Utah Counseling Ctr,,
2006 UT 52, «! 44, 147 P.3d 390 (third alteration in
original) (quoting Gurule. 2003 UT 25 at 1 7, 69
P.3d 1287). Moreover, there is no ambiguity in the
nature of claim requirement: "There must be
enough specificity in the notice to inform as to the
nature of the claim so that the defendant can appraise its potential liability/' Yeaniev v. Jensen,
798 P,2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990). in this case,
Plaintiffs' notice of claim failed to indicate that they
intended to pursue an intentional interference with
economic relations claim. Therefore. Plaintiffs are
precluded from raising that claim on appeal, ard the
trial court was correct in concluding that it lacked
jurisdiction to consider it.

(quotations and citation omitted)).
*906 [3] <[ 16 More precisely, in the context of
summary judgment, we are confined to the disputed
facts that were properly before the trial court. See
Granite Credit Union v. Remick 2006 UT App 115;
If 10 n. 4, 133 P.3d 440. In this instance, there are
no disputed issues of material fact in the record. In
fact, in their motion for summary judgment,
Plaintiffs included a lengthy undisputed facts section, after which they stated, ,%[T]here are no remaining genuine issues as to any material facts/'
When they responded to the City's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs disputed three facts, but
did not put any of these facts at issue because they
failed to support their memorandum with any admissible evidence, as required by rule 7 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Utah R. Civ. P.
7(c)(3)(B). Consequently, we do not further address
Plaintiffs' argument that there were disputed issues
of material fact.FV*
FN9. Plaintiffs also argue that there were
disputed issues of law, and ask this court to
apply the so-called "complexity analysis"
from Kennedy v. Silas Mason Ca, 334
U.S. 249, 256-57, 68 S.Ct 1031, 92 L.Ed
1347 (1948), to the tacts of this case.
However, this argument was not presented
below and therefore will not be considered
on appeal. See State v. Richins, 2004 UT
App 36, f 8, 86 R3d 759.

II. Disputed Facts
III. Protected Property Interest
| 15 Plaintiffs attempt to raise the issue, for the first
time on appeal that there was a dispute regarding
the Ordinance's effective date, thereby making summary judgment inappropriate. However, they are
barred from raising this issue on appeal because it
was not argued below. See State v. Richins, 2004
UT App 36, f 8, 86 P.3d 759 ("In order to preserve
an issue for appeal, it ... must be specifically raised
such that the issue is sufficiently raised to a level of
consciousness before the trial court, and must be
supported by evidence or relevant legal authority/*

[4] f 17 Plaintiffs claim that they had a protected
property interest in the water impact fee ^'permits"
because they had a 'legitimate claim of entitlement" to them,FNW The Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits states from depriving its citizens of
"property without due process of law/' U.S. Const,
amend. XIV, § I. To prevail on a due process
claim, a party must first establish that it has a
"protective property interest/' Hvde Park Co, v.
Santa Fe City Council, 226 F3d"l207 t 1210 (10th
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Cir.2000); see also Patterson v. American Fork
Ciiy. 2003 UT 7. c 23. 61 P.3d 466. This is an interest in which one has ** *a legitimate claim of entitlement/ " Patterson, 2003 UT 7 at r 25, 67 P.3d
466 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth 408 U.S.
564. 577. 92 S.Ct. 2701. 33 LEd.2d 548 (1972)), It
is not "an abstract need for. or [a] unilateral expectation of a benefit." Hyde Park 226 F.3d at 1210.
Rather, it is a "right to a particular decision reached
bv apphina rules to facts." Fleurv v. Clayton, 847
F*2d 123), 1231 (7th Cir. 1988).
FN 10. In their brief, Plaintiffs state that
they have a protected property interest in
%
*the water impact fees on the one hand, on
in the alternative, in the proper handling of
[their] funds." The "proper handling
claim" was not argued below, and therefore will not be considered on appeal. See
Richins. 2004 LT App 36 at«[ 8, 86 P.3d 759.
| 18 The Tenth Circuit explains that to establish a
legitimate claim of entitlement, the complaining
party must "demonstrate that a set of conditions exist under state and local law, 'the fulfillment of
which would give rise to a legitimate expectation4
that the City Council would approve" the plaintiffs
request. Hyde Park 226 F.3d at 1210 (quoting Jacobs, llscomi & Jacobs, Co. v. City of Lawrence,
927 F.2d 1111. 1116 (10th Cir. 1991)). The relevant
analysis revolves around "whether there is discretion in the defendants to deny [a permit or an action
requested] by the plaintiffs." Id. (quotations and
citation omitted). If there is considerable discretion,
one is not likely to have a legitimate claim of entitlement. See id. On the other hand, if the City has
little discretion to deny a permit or request, one
would be more likely to have a legitimate claim of
entitlement. See id. Under this standard. Plaintiffs
do not have a legitimate claim of entitlement to prepay water impact fees.
(5] f 19 Plaintiffs argue that they had a legitimate
claim of entitlement to the water impact fee permits
because the City was obligated to honor their pay-

ments and issue them water impact fee permits. In
other words, they assert that the City had no discretionary authority to deny them the permits and that
they therefore had a protected property interest in
them.FNil However, contrary to Plaintiffs* position, a water impact fee is not a "permit" that they
are entitled to obtain. Instead, a water impact fee is
a fee imposed as a prerequisite to obtaining a *907
building permit. See Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-102
(7)(a). More specifically, it is a charge "levied by
local governments against new development in order to generate revenue for capital funding necessitated by the new development." Salt Lake County v.
Board of Educ. of Granite Sck DisL, 808 P.2d
1056,
1058 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added)
(quotations and citation omitted). One of the
primary' purposes of impact fees is to "regulate new
growth and development and provide for adequate
public facilities and services." Id. at 1058-59.
Plaintiffs' argument that they are entitled to pay impact fees at a reduced rate prior to having any recognized development projects or pending building
permit applications circumvents the City's ability to
manage new growth and development and adequately provide for services needed as a result of
that growth.FNi:
FN 11. The City argues that we should not
address this argument because Plaintiffs
did not raise the discretionary authority argument below. However, this is merely an
extension of the legitimate expectation argument, which Plaintiffs briefed to the trial
court.
FN 12. The Ordinance also specifically
states that the impact fees "should be
charged to all new connections to the City's
culinary water system.** See Washington
City, Utah, Ordinance 2002-13 (Oct "'23,
200), and by their own admission, neither
Mr. Heideman nor Mr. Gardner had any
development projects ready for connection
to the City's water system.
[6] f 20 Also, Plaintiffs could not have had a legit-

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 10
155 P.3d 900, 569 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 2007 UT App 11
(Cite as: 155P.3d900)
imate claim of entitlement to the lower impact fee
because they did not meet the City's criteria for eligibility. At the December 11 hearing, the Ciry made
it clear that developers could pay the impact fee at
the $2284 rate if the developers provided building
permits to the City by December 26. 2002. Neither
Mr. Heideman nor Mr. Gardner complied with that
requirement. Therefore, they were not entitled to
pay die impact fees at the prior rate.
c

21 Plaintiffs argue that the "retroactive application of [the] condition precedent to obtaining impact fees at the lower price during the extension
period** was invalid, yet they offer no legal authorit) in support of that position. In contrast we find
convincing the City's position that it was entitled to
clarify the Ordinance without implicating due process concerns. See, e.g.. Foil v. Bullinger. 601 P.2d
144, 15i (Utah 1979) (finding no error in retroactive application of a law "where the later statute or
amendment deals only with clarification or amplification as to how the law should have been understood prior to its enactment.*" (quotations and citation omitted)).
[7] | 22 Even if a water impact fee were a permit,
as Plaintiffs suggest, they would not have been
automatically entitled to receive one. As the cases
Plaintiffs cite to in their brief make clear, those
seeking land-use permits do not have a protected
property interest in permit approval. See Hvile Park
Co. w' Sanni Fe Ciiy Council, 226 F.3d 1207,
1212-13 (10th Cir.2000) (finding no property interest in approval of proposed plat): Patterson v.
American Fork City. 2003 UT 7, % 24, 67 P.3d 466
(holding that land developers do '"not typically have
a claim of entitlement to a favorable [land-use] decision**). Plaintiffs distinguish their case by noting
that, in contrast to building or zoning permit cases.
there is no application requirement for water impact
fees. However, the fact that there is no application
process hurts, not helps. Plaintiffs' position. See
Hyde Park 226 F.3d at 1212-13 ("Because the ordinances as written contain no standards governing
the City Council's exercise of discretion, the ordin-

ances simply do not impose 'significant substantive
restrictions' on the City Council's power of review/*
(citation omitted)).
% 23 A legitimate claim of entitlement springs from
"existing rules and understandings that stem from
an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits/* Id. at
1210. As acknowledged in Plaintiffs' brief. "The
Impact Fees Act[, see Utah Code Ann. §>i
11-36-101, to -402 (2003).] establishes no
guidelines about when parties are eligible to purchase impact fees, what parties are eligible to purchase impact fees, etc.** Therefore, there are no
rules or guidelines that would have secured
Plaintiffs a certain benefit at the time they tendered
payment to the City. See Hyde, 226 FJd at
1212-13. In sum. Plaintiffs fail to establish that
they had a legitimate claim of entitlement to prepay
the water impact fees. As a result, several of their
remaining claims necessarily tail. ,;N-|-;
FN 13. Without a protected property interest. Plaintiffs' Article I Section 22, takings claim fails. See Baqfard v. Ephraim
Ciiy. 904 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Utah 1995)
C*To recover under [AJrtiele L [S]ection
22. a claimant must possess a protectable
interest in property that is taken or damaged for a public use."). The same is true
for their conversion claim. See Fibro
TrmL Inc. v. Brahman Fin. Inc.. 1999 UT
13, «I 20, 974 P.2d 288 (requiring current
possessory right to a chattel as a prerequisite to a conversion claim).
It is also worth noting that in their motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs
claimed conversion because they had a
protected property interest in the "water
impact permits at the time such permits
were applied for/* and when the City
failed to give them any permits, it interfered with their existing or potential
economic relations. On appeal, however,
they claim that they had a protected in-

©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 11
155 P.3d 900. 569 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 2007 UT App 11
(Cite as: 155 P3d 900)
terest in the money paid for the permits.
As previously noted, because Plaintiffs
did not raise this second argument before
the trial court, we will not consider it for
the first time on appeal. See Richins,
2004 UT App 36 at % 3, 86 P.3d 759.
*908 VI, Contractual Relationship
f 24 Plaintiffs argue that the City entered into a
contract with them by accepting payment for water
impact fee permits. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert
that when they tendered pasment to the City for the
impact fees, an offer occurred, and when the City's
front office staff accepted the payments and
provided a receipt, an acceptance occurred, thereby
creating an implied-in-fact contract.FN'U
FN 14. In their reply brief Plaintiffs state
that an offer occurred when the city council voted to extend the deadline to pay water impact fees or when they tendered the
money to the City. Because they are raising the argument that the City made an offer to them for the first time in their reply
brief, this court will not consider it. See
Romrell v. Zions First Natl Bunk, N.A.,
611 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah I9S0) ("As a general rule, an issue raised in a reply brief
will not be considered on appeal/').
However, even if this court did consider
the argument raised in Plaintiffs' reply
brief h would fail because there were
clearly no certain terms in the City's aliened offer. See Rapp v. Suit Lake Citv.
527 P.2d 651. 654 (Utah 1974).
[8][9] f 25 An express or implied-in-fact contract
results when "there is a manifestation of mutual assent, by words or actions or both, which reasonably
are interpretable as indicating an intention to make
a bargain with certain terms or terms which reasonably may be made certain." Rapp v. Salt Lake Citv,
527 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1974) (quotations and
citation omitted). We conclude there was no contract between the parlies in this matter because

there is no evidence that the necessary elements of
a contract were present. There was no offer to enter
into a contract, no acceptance from anyone qualified to enter into contracts for the City, and no
communication that would indicate any type of
meetins of the minds. See id; see also Trevino &
Gonzalez Co. v. RE Midler Co.. 949 S.W.2d 39,
42 (Tex.App.1997) ("The application for an issuance of a building permit does not constitute a voluntary agreement between the parties to enter into
binding contract/').
% 26 There is also no evidence that the City voted
on a contract with Plaintiffs or had one signed by
the citv recorder as required bv Utah Code sections
10-3-506 and 10-6-138. See Utah Code Ann. §§
10-3-506, 10-6-138 (2003): see also Patterson
2003 UT 7 at «[ 13. 67 P.3d 466 (finding no binding
contract with city because city council never voted
on or approved a binding agreement); Rapp, 527
P.2d at 654 (requiring statutory formalities
"[particularly in the case of public contracts"). But
see Canjietdv. Layum Caw 2005 UT 60. « 17, 122
P.3d 622 (observing the possibility of an implied
employment contract with a municipality based on
** 'the conduct of the parties, announced personnel
policies, practices of that particular trade or industry, or other circumstances' " (quoting Beruhe v.
Fashion Or.. Ltdt 771 P.2d 1033. 1044 (Utah
1989))).
[10] % 27 Additionally. Plaintiffs' argument offends
public policy. As the Colorado Court of Appeals
held, if the issuance of a permit, or. as is the case
here, the acceptance of a fee were to create a
"binding obligation ... the City's ability to protect
the health, safety, and welfare of the public would
be seriously hampered/* Patzer \\ Citv of Loveland.
80 P.3d 908. 911 (Colo.Ct.App.2Q03). As a result,
we do not disturb the trial court's conclusion that no
contract existed between the parties.FS!5
FN 15. Because there was no contract, there
was necessarily no breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. See Buekner
v. Kennard 2004 UT 78. f 31 ^99 P.3d 842

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 12
155 P.3d 900, 569 Utah Adv. Rep. 5,2007 UT App 11
(Cite as: 155 PJd 900)
("Any claim for breach of contract must be
predicated on the existence of an express
or implied contract, in this case a contract
for employment.")*
*909 CONCLUSION
f 28 Plaintiffs fail to identify a protected property
interest on appeal they have not provided any evidence indicating that there was a contract between
the parties, and their notice of claim was facially
insufficient. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's
grant of summary judgment.
f 29 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS and
GREGORY K. ORME, Judges.
Utah App.,2007.
Heideman v. Washington City
155 PJd 900. 569 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 2007 UT App
II
END OF DOCUMENT

©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM "5"
(Peeples v. State, 2004 UTApp 328, 100 P.3d
254)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Westlaw
Page 1
100 P.3d 254. 509 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 2004 UT App 328
(Cite as: 100 P.3d 254)

H
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Delone PEEPLES, an individual Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF UTAH; and Magna Investments and
Development, a limited partnership, Defendants
and Appellee.
No. 20030509-CA.
Sept, 23, 2004.
Background: Pedestrian brought negligence action
against owner of building from which water allegedly dripped on sidewalk and froze, and against
the state, alleging that she slipped and fell on ice in
front of a state liquor store. The Third District
Court. Salt Lake Department Timothy R. Hanson.
J., dismissed complaint for failure to compK with
notice requirements of Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Pedestrian appealed.
Holding: The Court of Appeals. Thome. J., held
that pedestrian complied with requirement for brief
statement of the facts in mandatory notice of claim
under Act
Reversed and remanded.

Jackson, JL concurred and filed opinion.

Davis, J., dissented and filed opinion.
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Before Judges DAVIS, JACKSON, and THORNE.

OPINION
THORNE, Judge:
% i The trial court dismissed Delone Peeples's complaint for failure to strictly complj with the Utah

Governmental Immunity Act (Act), which requires
claimants to present a "brief statement of the faces'*
in their mandatory notice of claim. Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-11 (3)(a)("i) (1997). FNI We reverse and remand.
FN1. Effective July I, 2004, the relevant
provision was reenacted as Utah Code section 63-30d-401 (3)(a)(i).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND *«

FN2. "When determining whether a trial
court properly dismissed a complaint, we
accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider them, and all
reasonable inferences to be drawn from
them, in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party." Wood v. University of
Utah Med Or,. 2002 UT 134,1 ^ 61 P.3d
436, cert denied, 540 LLS. 946, 124 S.Ct.
388. 157 LEd.2d 276 (2003). wWe recite
the facts accordingly." hi
[I] f 2 On December 5, 2001, Peeples slipped and
fell on an icy sidewalk in front of the Utah State Liquor Store located at 1863 East 7000 South in Salt
Lake City, injuring her hip. Peeples's attorneys first
informed the Utah State Risk Management Department (the Department) of Peeples's accident by letter dated March 12, 2002, This initial letter identified Peeples, stated the date and alleged cause of
the accident, asserted that Peeples had suffered
multiple injuries, and identified by address the liquor store where the accident occurred. The letter
also requested*256 information regarding insurance
coverage.
f 3 On June 17, 2002, Peeples's attorneys sent the
Department another letter describing Peeples's
background and injuries in greater detail, along
with other reports and information related to the accident. This letter also identified Peeples and the
date of the accident, but referred to the location of
the accident solely as "the Utah State Liquor

©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Oris. US Gov. Works.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 4
tOO PJd 254, 509 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 2004 U T App 328
(Cite as: 100 P.3d 254)
Store." An ambulance report that appears to have
been enclosed with this letter indicates that Peeples
was transported by ambulance from 1864 East Fort
Union, an address very near the liquor store identified in the March 12 letter.
f 4 On September 18. 2002, Peeples filed a notice
of claim with the Utah Attorney General pursuant
to the Act. Peeples's notice of claim contained the
following statement of the facts and circumstances
of her accident: "On December 5. 2001, Ms.
Peeples fell In front of a Utah State Liquor Store on
ice. which was allowed to accumulate on the sidewalk, from a poorly designed rain gutter that drains
onto the top of the sidewalk, rather than underneath
it" The notice of claim did not identify the liquor
store by address or otherwise.
f 5 Peeples brought suit against the property owner
and the State. The State moved to dismiss Peeples's
claim pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, alleging that she failed to strictly
comply with the Act's requirement that her notice
of claim include a "brief statement of the facts."
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(3)(a)(i) (1997). The trial court concluded that, in a slip and fall case, the
brief statement of the facts required by the Act
"must identify the location of the accident." Notwithstanding the prior communications between
Peeples's counsel and the Department, the trial
court concluded that because Peeples's notice of
claim failed to provide the address where her accident occurred, Peeples failed to comply with the
"brief statement of the facts" provision of the Act.
Id The trial court subsequently dismissed the State
from Peeples's law suit. Peeples appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[2] f 6 The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial
court properly dismissed Peeples's complaint for
failure to comply with the Act's notice of claim provisions. "Compliance with the ... Act is a prerequisite to vesting a district court with subject matter jurisdiction over claims against governmental entities.

Accordingly, a district court's dismissal of a case
based [on the Act] is a determination of law that we
afford no deferencefand review] for correctness.**
Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT I6,*f 9, 40 PJd
632 (citations omitted).

ANALYSIS
% 1 The Act requires that a notice of claim "shall set
forth: (i) a brief statement of the facts; (ii) the
nature of the claim asserted; and (iii) the damages
incurred by the claimant so far as the\ are known."
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(iV(iii) (1997).
Decisions of this court and the Utah Supreme Court
have uniformly held that claimants must strictly
comply with the Act's notice provisions. See, e.g..
Guritle v. Salt Lake Countw 2003 UT 25.1 5. 69
PJd 1287; Nunez v. Albo. 2002 UT App 247tJ 21.
53 P.3d 2, cert, denied 59 PJd 603 (Utah 2002).
"The only authority for allowing less than strict
compliance is found in cases which depended upon
ambiguities in the Act." Gurule, 2003 UT 25 at f" 7,
69 PJd 1287: see, e.g., Larson v. Park Citv Mun.
Corp., 955 PJd 343, 345-46 (Utah 1998) (allowing
claim where statute was unclear as to where notice
was to be filed).
P][4][5] % 8 "When faced with a question of statutory construction ... this court first looks to the
plain language of the statute/' In re Estate of Flake,
2003 i f 17.*: 25, 71 P J d 589. "In construing a
statute, we assume that 'each term in the statute
was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are
read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably
confused or inoperable/ '* Id. (quoting Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 PJd 664,
670 (Utah 1991)). We find no ambiguity in the
Act's "brief statement of the facts" provision and
conclude that the plain language of that provision
*257 does not require specifics. IN3 While specific
information might well be helpful, it would not be
appropriate for this court to "improve" the statute
by reading an additional element into the legislatively mandated notice requirements. Pursuant to
statute, a claimant complies merely by providing a
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brief statement of facts about the claim being made.
FN3. "A statute is not ambiguous merely
because the parties disagree about its
meaning." State v. Beason. 2000 UT App
109.*; 19. 2 P.3d 459. Rather, - * "[a] statute is ambiguous [only] if it can be understood by reasonably well-informed persons
to have different meanings." * v hi (second
alteration in original) (quoting Derbidge v.
Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788,
791 (Utah Ct.App.i998)) (other citation
omitted). Our conclusion that the statutory
language is unambiguous renders irrelevant any dispute over whether Peeples's notice satisfied the legislative intent of the
Act. See State v. Vigil. 842 P.2d 843. 845
{Utah 1992) (*To determine [what] the legislature intended ... we begin with the
statutes' plain language. We will resort to
other methods of statutory interpretation
only if we find the language of the statutes
to be ambiguous/'), overruled in part on
other grounds bv State v. Casew 2003 UT
55,82P.3d 1106'.
[6][7][8][9] % 9 Having determined that the Act
while not a model of specific clarity, is not ambiguous, our analysis turns to whether Peeples's notice
strictly complied with the Act. The strict compliance standard favors the State, and its application
often results in the barring of claims. See. e.g.,
Gunite, 2003 UT 25 at f( 4-8. 69 P.3d 1287
(barring claim when notice was not properly directed to county clerk, even though notice was timely
directed to county commissioner); Greene v. Utah
Transit Atttk, 2001 UT 109,5 17, 37 P.3d 1156
(barring claim when notice was not properly directed to president or secretary of UTA board, despite
communications with and timely notice to claims
adjuster): Thimmes w Utah State Univ.. 2001 UT
App 93.°; 2, 6-7. 22 P.3d 257 (barring claim when
notice directed to risk management rather than attorney general). Strict compliance is not, however,
a one-way street, and a claimant is not required to

do more than the Act clearly requires. Notice need
not be given to any person other than that directed
by statute, even if that person's awareness of the
claim might facilitate investigation or settlement;
notice provided exactly one year after an injury
arises is just as timely as notice comfortably
provided six months earlier; and so on. All that is
required is simple compliance, and there is no need
for a claimant to exceed the Act's requirements
even if such action might more optimally accomplish the purposes underlying the Act.
[10] f 10 In this case. Peeples's notice does strictly
comply with the Act's requirements. The relevant
sentence from Peeples's notice of claim states that
'*[o]n December 5. 2001, Ms. Peeples fell in front
of a Utah State Liquor Store on ice. which was allowed to accumulate on the sidewalk, from a poorlydesigned rain gutter that drains onto the top of the
sidewalk, rather than underneath it." By definition,
this is a statement. It contains multiple facts, including the date of Peeples's injury, its alleged
cause, details of the alleged property defect, and
that the injury occurred at a Utah State Liquor
Store. Finally, as complained of by the State, it is
undeniably brief. FN'4 Peeples's satisfaction of
these factors complies with the "brief statement of
the facts" requirement of the Act.FV*
FN4. Judge Jackson's concurring opinion
would find a point at which a "brief statement of the facts" can be too brief. This
author does not find that issue to be before
the court today, and accordingly refrains
from joining in Judge Jackson's otherwise
thoughtful concurrence.
FN5. We are not unaware of the potential
for mischief that our literal interpretation
of the Act's language may present. As a
practical matter, however, claimants have
an interest in providing sufficient facts to
move their claims forward and avoid litigation over the adequacy of their notice.
There is no evidence in this case that the
omission of the location of Peeples's acci-
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dent was a significant impediment to the
State obtaining adequate information concerning the claim or acting upon it.
[II] *J II Even if we were to view the brevity of
Peeples's claim as a defect "defects in the form or
content of notices of claim do not always act to bar
a claim:* Brittain v. State. 882 P.2d 666. 669 (Utah
Ct.App.1994): cf. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hasp..
Inc.. 675 P.2d 1179. 1183 {Utah 1983); Spencer v.
Salt Lake City. 17 Utah 2d }62. 412 P.2d 449. 450
(1966) (finding sufficient *258 notice of claim despite failure to declare the amount of damages as required by statute). We find the supreme court's analysis of a similar provision within the Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act see Utah Coda Ann. §§
78-14-1 to -17 (2002), to be instructive:
Defendant also argues that denial of the motion
[to amend] was proper because the proposed
amendment set forth additional allegations and
claims outside the scope of plaintiffs notice of
intent to sue, which had been filed prior to commencement of this action. A notice of intent to
sue. as required by [Utah Code section 78-14-8
(2002) ], is not intended to be the equivalent of a
complaint and need not contain every allegation
and claim set forth in the complaint.... Although
the notice must include "specific allegations of
misconduct on the part of the prospective defendant/* that requirement does not need to meet the
standards required to state a claim for relief in a
complaint. The parties need to give only general
notice of an intent to sue and of the injuries then
known and not a statement of legal theories.
Behrem, 675 P.2d at 1183, In our view, the Act's
"brief statement of the facts" requirement is no
more stringent than the "specific allegations of misconduct" requirement addressed in Behrem. As
such, factual notice under the Act need not "meet
the standards required to state a claim for relief/'
and factual defects in the notice will not bar a claim
so long as the claim gives "general notice of an intent to $m." hi

% 12 While the State may desire more information
than Peepies provided, that desire does not render
Peeples's notice insufficient under the plain language of the Act. Rather, the State may obtain the
desired information through formal discover), informal communications with claimant's counsel,
and/or its own investigation/^ Alternatively, the
legislature may choose, as it has in the past, to require claimants to provide more specific facts in a
notice of claim. See, e.g.. Sweet v. Suit Lake GVv.
43 Utah 306. 134 P. 1167. 1169 (1913) (discussing
prior version of the Act requiring, in certain claims,
notice "stating the particular time at which the injury happened, and designating and describing the
particular place in which it occurred, and also particularly describing the cause and circumstances of
the said injury or damages " (emphasis in origina»).
FN6. In this case, the State had actual
knowledge of the location of Peeples's accident from prior correspondence with
Peeples's attorneys.
«f 13 Because the Act's "brief statement of the facts"
requirement is unambiguous. Peeples's notice of
claim was required to provide such a statement, no
more and no less. Peeples's notice contained a brief
statement of facts about her alleged accident and injury. Therefore, her notice strictly complied with
the Act's requirement.

CONCLUSION
f 14 The trial court incorrectly ruled that Peeples's
notice of claim did not strictly comply with Utah
Code section 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(i). We reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JACKSON, Judge (concurring):
f 15 I concur in the opinion but write separately to
lay out my methodology for understanding what the
broad "brief statement of the facts" demands of
claimants. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (3)(a)(i)
(1997) repealed and reenacted as § 63-30d-401
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(Supp.2004). Starting with the plain language of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the Act), the
pivotal term "brief* indicates that the claimant need
not recite in comprehensive detail all of the facts
pertaining to the claim. Thus. I conclude that the requirement is not an exacting one and that the State
has no reasonable expectation that a claimant's notice will satisfy every informational need.
«[ \6 The analysis could end here, but this case
raises a further question: Even if the State cannot
expect to have all of the details, is there a point at
which a claimant's statement of the facts is so
devoid of information as to be insufficient? In other
words, can a claimant's "brief statement of the
facts" be, *259 in fact too brief? I agree with Judge
Thome that a claimant's statement of the facts
should not be faulted for brevity, but, in my view,
there is a point-albeit a considerably low one-at
which a statement of the facts can be overly brief.
f 17 The point at which a brief statement of the
facts becomes insufficient is defined in part by the
purposes of the Act. Although we focus on the "
'plain language/ M we also "recognizfe] that 'our
primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to
achieve/" Dowling v. Bullen. 2004 UT 504 8, 94
P.3d 915 (quoting Evans v. State. 963 P.2d 177,
184 (Utah 1998)). Accordingly. 1 agree with the
dissent that the notice required by the Act seeks to
achieve the dual purposes of (1) affording the State
with an opportunity to investigate and expeditiously
settle the case and (2) allowing the State to correct
dangerous conditions. See, e.g.. Wills v. Heher Valley^Hhioric R.R. Audi. 2003 UT 45,5 6, 79 P.3d
934; Larson v. Park City Mim. Corp., 955 P.2d 343,
345-46 (Utah 1998).
f 18 However, in assessing the statutory methods
by which these purposes are to be achieved, I determine that the brief statement of the facts plays
only a minor role. Of course, in emphasizing the
notice's reduced role I do not mean to diminish the
claimant's responsibility to provide timely and accurate information. Nonetheless, it seems almost

axiomatic to me that a "brief statement of the facts"
was not intended to act as the primary vehicle for
the State's investigation and remedial efforts.
f 19 Ideally, the "brief statement of the tacts"
should be informative and useful. A circumspect
claimant would probably include the address of an
accident. However, based on my understanding of
the notice requirement's limited role, I conclude
that a notice's brief statement of the facts is sufficient, at a minimum, when it both identifies the
claimants and the general facts establishing the
claim.FNI Such information is enough to meet the
notice's primary goal in the statutory scheme: to
warn the State that a particular plaintiff now plans
to assert a particular claim and that all prior and
subsequent information provided by the claimant
should be collected, organized, and investigated.
FNI. I emphasize "'general** facts because
it is only natural that the level of detail required in a notice supported by a "brief
statement of the facts" ought to be less
stringent than that required by a formal
pleading. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a)
(requiring pleadings to contain a "short
and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief*). Because our notice-pleading requirements are
aireadv minimal, see Guardian Title Co. v.
Mitchell 2002 UT 63,«f 15 n. 4, 54 P.3d
130 (%i[A]ll that is required is that the
pleadings be sufficient to give fair notice
of the nature and basis of the claim asserted and a general indication of the type of
litigation involved.**) (citation and quotation omitted), the notice required by section 63-30-11 should demand even less
factual detail.
f 20 I disagree with the dissent's position that the
sufficiency of a claimant's notice with regard to
these purposes should become a matter of factintensive inquiry. Although the "brief statement of
the facts*' requirement invites judicial factweighing in this case, I am concerned that such an
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approach may prove wasteful and ultimately unfair.
A fact-intensive analysis would undermine judicial
economy since the sufficiency of even "brief statement of the facts" would fall into question. More
importantly, it also places an unfair burden on
claimants to intuit what information a particular
State entity may or may not require to expeditiously
investigate and repair a particular incident. For example, would it be sufficient for a claimant injured
on the grounds of the state capitol to include the address of the capitol or would the State require more
precise information? Such high stakes should not be
attached to a citizen's relatively unimportant determination of which details to include in the "brief
statement of the facts" and which to include in
more co?nprehensive filings.
f 21 In the present case, the State had sufficient information to investigate the claim because Peeples
identified herself and the facts underlying her
claim. Also, prior to the notice, she provided information indicating the location of the accident
and therefore she was not required to restate the information in her brief statement of the facts.
f 22 Accordingly, I concur in the opinion.
*260 DAVIS, Judge (dissenting):
f 23 1 dissent. I agree that the Act requires that a
notice of claim "shall set forth ... (i) a brief statement of the tacts: (ii) the nature of the claim asserted: and (iii) the damages incurred by the claimant
so far as they are known." Utah Code Ann. §
63-30-1 !(3Xa)(i)-(iii) (Supp.2003). The notice of
claim provision, as well as other provisions under
the Act. requires strict compliance by claimants.
See Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16,1 13, 40
P.3d 632 n j j h e ... Act demands strict compliance
with its requirements to allow suit against governmental entities. The notice of claim provision, particularly, neither contemplates nor allows for anything less/*). If a complaint does not strictly comply
with the requirements of the Act, plaintiffs cannot
brim* suit ''against the [SJtate or its subdivisions/*
Id atf II.

f 24 While a notice of claim is required to
"provide[ ] the entity being sued with the factual
details of the incident that led to the plaintiffs
claim," Rushton v. Salt Lake County. 1909 UT 36, c
20. 977 P.2d 1201, the Act does not further define
what constitutes a sufficient "brief statement of the
facts/' Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(i).
However, Utah caselaw has established two purposes of the notice of claim. "[T]he purposefs] of
such notice of claim [are] to provide the governmental entity an opportunity to [ (I) ] correct the
condition that caused the injury.[and (2) ] evaluate
the claim, and perhap: settle the matter without the
expense of litigation/* Larson v. Park City Mun.
Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 345-46 (Utah 1998)>» "In
deciding how to file a notice of claim upon [the
State] to satisfy the Act, a claimant has no other
choice but to rely upon the statutes and upon the
purpose of the notice statute .../* Id at 346
(emphasis added).
FN I. Notwithstanding the lead
assertion to the contrary, our
court has already "improved" the
Larson v. Park Cirv Mun. Corp.,
343. 345-46 (Utah 1998).

opinion's
supreme
Act. See
955 P.2d

% 25 Based upon the plain language of the Act, see
Dick Simon Trucking, Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n., 2004 UT 1 U«j 17, 84 P.3d 1197 ('• 4When
interpreting statutes, we determine the statute's
meaning by first looking to the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain language unless
the language is ambiguous/ ** (citation omitted)):
LovemIahl\\ Jordan Sell DisL. 2002 UT I30,«[ 21,
63 P.3d 705 (same), Plaintiffs notice of claim constituted a "brief statement of the facts/* Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-1 !(3)(a)(i). Plaintiffs notice of claim
read, in relevant part,
On December 55 2001, Ms. Peeples fell in front
of a Utah State Liquor Store on ice, which was
allowed to accumulate on the sidewalk, from a
poorly designed rain gutter that drains onto the
top of the sidewalk, rather than underneath it.
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Whether the brief statement of the facts in a notice
of claim addresses the purposes underlying the notice requirement is, however, fact dependent-a point
conceded by the State in its brief as follows:
The phrase a a brief statement of facts" is not statutorily defined. That is because section 63-30-11,
by definition, applies to any claim asserted
against the State and so it must be general enough
to apply to all mariner of claims-slip[-]and[-]fall
claims such as this case, as well as cases that
arise out of very different circumstances. Thus,
section 63-30-1 l(3)(a) must be generally worded
in order to fulfill the purposes of the Act in any
caseJ|p : i

FN2. At oral argument counsel for the
State agreed that respecting certain claims,
such as defamation, location would be irrelevant. It is undisputed, however, that
location is relevant to the purposes of correcting the condition and evaluating the
claim in this case.
Reiving on Pigs Gun Club, Inc v. Sanpete County,
2002 UT I 7 / f 10, 42 P.3d 379. and Rmhton v. Salt
Lake County, 1999 UT 36,f 20, 977 P.2d 1201,
however, the trial court ruled as a matter of law
that, in effect, the notice document must contain
both the notice requirements in the Act and the purposes of the notice statute. This notwithstanding,
the State was well aware of which Utah State Liquor Store was the subject of Plaintiffs claim and
thereby in a position to (I) "correct the condition
that caused the injury/" and (2) "evaluate the claim,
and perhaps settle the matter without the expense of
litigation/' *26i Larson 955 P.2d at 345-46.FN3
Neither of the cases relied upon by the trial court,
nor any of the other so-called actual notice cases,
address what constitutes a "brief statement of the
facts." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (3)(a)(i); see
Gurule v. Salt Lake County 2003 UT 25,«j 5, 69
P.3d 1287 (concluding that actual notice by a municipality of a potential claim does not lower the
strict compliance standard for filing a notice of
claim, but not addressing whether the notice com-

plied with the brief statement of the facts requirement). Although the focus of Larson is upon the determination of what constitutes the "governing
body" for the purpose of filing a notice of claim,
Larson is nonetheless instructive. Larson 955 P.2d
at 345 (quotations and citation omitted). The Larson court, having reiterated the purposes set out in
Stahi v. Utah Transit Authority 618 P,2d 480. 482
(Utah 1980). and having declared that "a claimant
has no other choice but to rely upon the statutes and
upon the purpose of the notice statute ** engaged in
a purpose-based, fact-intensive analysis to determine which government official is "reasonably and
logically" the proper person to receive the filing.
FM
Larson, 955 P.2d at 346 (emphasis added).
FN3. f fail to see the point of the lead
opinion's analysis of irrelevant strict compliance cases and observation that i4[t]he
strict compliance standard favors the State/'
FN4. A point counsel for the State refused
to concede at oral argument, asserting that
some critical person at the State may not
have had actual knowledge of the location
and needed to rely solely on the notice.
f 26 Whether the purposes of the notice of claim
are addressed in any given case is contextual and
requires a fact inquiry. "Purpose" is defined as
"[a]n objective, goal or end/' Black's Law Dictionary 1250 (7th ed.1999), "something set up as an object or end to be attained," or "an action in course
of execution/' Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary
957 (9th ed/1986). Thus, the concept of ^purpose"
is inherently prospective in nature. A notice of
claim that must be relied upon for the recipient to
appropriately and prospectively respond would
have to contain sufficient information to guide the
response. It is absurd, however, having complied
with the plain language of the statute, to require a
notice of claim to contain information already obtained to accomplish the purpose of providing an
opportunity to correct, evaluate, and perhaps settlea purpose that has already been accomplished and.
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therefore, is no longer a purpose,
€

\ 27 Therefore. 1 conclude that when determining
whether a notice of claim contains a sufficient
"brief statement of the facts/' Utah Code Ann. §
63-30-1 i(3)(a)(iX a trial court must when necessary, make a fact inquiry to determine if the purposes of (I) correcting the condition that caused the
injun, and (2) evaluating a claim, and possibly settling the claim without litigation have been satisfied.r v See Larson. 955 P.2d at 345-46. Since the
State has refused to concede satisfaction of the purpose requirements in this case, it should have an
opportunity to address the issue before the trial court.
FN5. Cf Johnson v. G7v of Boimiifui 996
F.Supp. 1100. 1103 (D.Utah 1998) (ruling
that "Utah requires strict compliance with
the notice of claim provision. Nonetheless.
'defects in the form or content of notices
of claim do not always act to bar a claim.'
By including the police report and informing Bountiful that Plaintiff was injured, the
letter may satisfy the first required element
of a notice of claim/* (citation and emphasis omitted)).
f 28 Accordingly, I also would reverse the trial
court's dismissal, but remand for the purpose of
conducting a fact inquiry to determine whether the
aforementioned purposes have been satisfied. See id
Utah App...2004.
Peeples v. State of Utah
100 P.3d 254. 509 Utah Adv. Rep. 16. 2004 UT
App 328
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